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INTRODUCTION

T

HE GENERAL AVIATION Revitalization Act of 1994
("GARA")' established an 18-year statute of repose for law-

Many people contributed to the effort to enact the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, which, as this article will show, helped preserve the general
aviation industry in the United States. The following are among them. George
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suits against manufacturers of general aviation aircraft and
component parts.2 Passed as an effort to revive the ailing general aviation aircraft industry, GARA was hailed as a 'job-creating and job-restoring measure."3 It has fulfilled its promise. In
the past seven years, the general aviation aircraft industry has
briskly rebounded - and many credit GARA for that result.
Opponents of the bill, however, argued prior to its passage
that the bill was unnecessary, and that it would deprive people
injured in general aviation aircraft accidents of their right to
seek compensation. Since the enactment of GARA, plaintiffs
have offered creative arguments to avoid the application of the
repose period in their cases.'
For the most part, courts have recognized the need for GARA
and they have interpreted GARA's provisions to further Congressional intent. Some courts, however, have limited the application of GARA. Such rulings, if carried to the extreme, will
undo much of the good accomplished by GARA.
This article provides an overview of the history and purpose of
GARA. It shows the accomplishments of the legislation. It analyzes GARA's provisions and the key case law that has construed
it. It demonstrates why the law is constitutional. Finally, the article provides a foundation for future interpretations of GARA.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF GENERAL AVIATION

General aviation is all aviation other than commercial and
military aviation. General aviation aircraft range from small, single-engine planes to mid-size turboprops to the larger turbofans
capable from flying from New York to Tokyo. These planes are
Underhill, a pilot and successful businessman in Louisville, Kentucky, inspired
the concept behind GARA. Many public servants helped enact GARA, but special
efforts were made by then-Kansas Representative Dan Glickman, Utah Representative James Hansen, and Senators Nancy Kassebaum and John McCain. Frank
Hunger, Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division at the Department of
Justice, understood the severity of the problem and the need for a fair and balanced legislative solution. His support helped persuade President Clinton to sign
GARA into law.
2 Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 2(d), 108 Stat. 1552 (1994), amended, Pub. L. No. 105102, § 3(e), 111 Stat. 2215 (1997) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note).
3 See President's Signing Statement, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1678 (Aug.
22, 1994), relrinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1654 [hereinafter "President's Signing
Statement"].
4 See Kathryn Humphrey, Esq., Remarks, General Aviation Revitalization Act Panel
Discussion, 63J. AIR L. & Com. 169, 175 (1997).
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used for business and recreation.5 They are used by federal,
state and local governments for activities ranging from emergency medical evacuations to border patrols to firefighting.
They are used by individuals and businesses, colleges and universities, and other interests to reach the more than 5,000 small
and rural communities in the United States that are not served
by commercial airlines. 6
Since the time of the Wright Brothers, the United States has
dominated nearly every aspect of aviation, including general aviation manufacturing.7 Industry pioneers like Walter and Olive
Ann Beech, Clyde Cessna, William Piper, and Bill Lear built major companies.8 World War II produced a number of highly
trained pilots, aircraft mechanics, and aerospace engineers, who
built "a multitude of single- and multi-engine light piston aircraft" in their "backyard garages, small town factories, and major
manufacturers' plants."9 Ex-army air corps personnel provided
aircraft maintenance, fuel services, sales support, and pilot training. " ' With the resultant surge in interest in general aviation
5 See United States General Accounting Office, Pub. No. GAO-01-916, General
Aviation: Status of the Industry, Related Infrastructure,and Safety Issues 2, 10-12 (2001)
[hereinafter "GAO General Aviation Report"]. "In 1998, personal flying accounted for 36 percent of all general aviation hours flown, nearly three times
more than the next largest segment, business flying." Id. at 2. "The other major
use categories include corporate flying, which involves the use of an aircraft
owned by a corporation or business and flown by a professional pilot; instructional flying; and aerial application, which includes activities such as agricultural
spraying." Id.
The general aviation fleet in the United States consists of about 219,000 active aircraft with an average age of about 27 years. [d. The largest category of
aircraft is single-engine propeller, typically used for personal and instructional
flying, which in 1998 made up 70 percent of the general aviation fleet.
7

See

GENERAL AVIATION MANUFACTURERS

ASSOCIATION, LIABILITY REFORM

FOR

A NEED AT THE POINT OF CRISIS 3 (1992) [hereinafter "A
Need at the Point of Crisis"].
8 Review of Revisions in Small Aircraft Liability Laws: Statement before the Subcomm.
on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce & Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Edward M. Bolen,
President, General Aviation Manufacturers Association) [hereinafter "Bolen Testimony"]. Cessna Aircraft Company and Piper Aircraft Corporation emerged as
the dominant manufacturers of small, single engine two- and four-passenger airplanes. See Robert Martin, General Aviation Manufacturing:An Industry Under Siege,
in THE LIABILITY MAZE 478, 480 (Peter W. Huber & Robert Litan eds. 1991).
Beech Aircraft Corporation concentrated on the manufacture of somewhat
larger and more expensive aircraft. Id.
9 Timothy S. McAllister, A "Tail" of Liability Reform: General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 and the General Aviation Industry in the United States, 23 TRANSP. L.J.
301, 304 (1995).
1o Id.
GENERAL AvIATION:
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during the 1960s and 1970s, "the 'Big Three' [manufacturers]
created a comprehensive product line of general aviation aircraft, established an infrastructure that provided sales and training, and aggressively marketed the industry of general
aviation."' 1 As interest in general aviation rose, its safety increased. The number of fatal general aviation aircraft accidents
dropped 700 percent between the end of World War II and
1994. The general aviation accident rate itself dropped by 30
percent between 1981 and 1994.12
By the late 1970s, the general aviation industry in the United
States was at its high point. Twenty-nine aircraft manufacturers
produced general aviation aircraft, and the industry reported
revenues of more than $2 billion a year.13 General aviation and
its related industries contributed more than $40 billion annually
14
to the U.S. economy and employed more than 540,000 people.
But by the end of the 1980s, the general aviation industry was
in economic trouble. There was a serious and "precipitous" decline in the manufacture and sale of general aviation aircraft by
U.S. companies.' 5 One cause was the increase in the price of a
plane. This, in turn, was fueled by the tremendous increase in
the cost of the industry's liability insurance.'" General aviation
aircraft shipments by U.S. manufacturers dropped from 18,000
aircraft in 1978 to 928 aircraft in 1994.'" The decline was even
more significant for single engine piston aircraft: 14,000 aircraft
built in 1978 to 555 aircraft built in 1993.18 Along with the loss
of production came the loss of over 100,000jobs in general aviaI Jennifer L. Anton, A CriticalEvaluation of the General Aviation Revitalization Act
of 1994, 63J. AIR L. & COM. 759, 766 (1998) (citing McAllister, supra note 9, at
304-05).
12 140 CONG. REc. H4998-02, H5000 (daily ed. June 27, 1994) (statement of
Rep. Clinger) [hereinafter "Clinger Statement"].
13 See Thomas H. Kister, General Aviation Revitalization Act: Its Effect on Manufacturers, 65 DEF. COUNS.J. 109, 110-11 (1998) (quoting John H. Boswell & George
Andrew Coats, Saving the General Aviation Industry: PuttingTort Reform to the Test, 60
J. AIR L. & COM. 533, 535 (1995)); William J. Cook, The Take Off in the Small-Plane
Market After Years on the Ground, The Industry Looks Up,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Aug. 21, 1995, at 50; McAllister, supra note 9, at 305.
14 See GAO General Aviation Report, supra note 5.
15 See McAllister, supra note 9, at 305-06.
16 See H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 2, at 1646 (1994); see also McAllister, supra
note 9, at 306-07.
17 See GAO General Aviation Report, supra note 5, at 4.
18 140 CONG. REc. H4998-02, H5000 (daily ed. June 27, 1994) (statement of
Rep. Oberstar) [hereinafter "Oberstar Statement"].
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tion manufacturing and related industries.'" In 1978, the industry manufactured 18,000 general aviation aircraft and employed
6,000 workers. In 1992, the industry manufactured only 900
general aviation aircraft and employed only 1,000 workers.2"
This decline in general aviation manufacturing also worsened
the United States' position in international trade. Historically,
at least 30 percent of the general aviation aircraft produced in
the United States had been exported.21 In 1980, the United
States exported $120 million surplus in single engine piston aircraft, but that surplus declined to a mere $5 million in 1992.22
In 1980, there were 29 U.S. manufacturers of general aviation
aircraft and 15 foreign manufacturers. By 1992, the numbers
had switched: there were 29 foreign manufacturers, and only 9
U.S. manufacturers.2 3
II.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF GARA
A.

IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM

By the mid-1980s, Congress had launched efforts to provide
relief for domestic manufacturers of general aviation aircraft.
Congressional hearings found that the biggest factor in the in19 See id.; see also John H. Boswell & George Andrew Coats, Saving the General
Aviation Industry: Putting Tort Reform to the Test, 60 J. AIR L. & CoM. 533, 574 n.3
(1995) (citing Russell W. Meyer, Statute of Repose - Key to Industy Future, in GENERAL AVIATION MFG. ASS'N INDUS. REV.: 1994 OUTLOOK AND AGENDA 1 (Feb. 9,
1994)).
21 140 CONG. REc. S2995-01, S2996 (daily ed. March 16, 1994) (statement of
Sen. Hutchison). Cessna closed its single engine aircraft production lines in

1986 based solely on a perceived unlimited exposure to litigation. See Meyer,
supra note 19, at 1. Piper Aircraft, one of the leading manufacturers of general
aviation aircraft since the 1930s, experienced several decades of growth through
the 1970s - selling more than 5,000 aircraft annually by the late 1970s. But
throughout the 1980s, Piper's sales plummeted as the general aviation industry
suffered. "By 1990, the Company was selling less than 1/10th the number of
aircraft it had sold during the previous 10 years." Review of Revisions in Small Aircraft Liability Laws- Statement before the Senate Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign
Commerce & Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp., 105th
Cong. (1997) (statement of Paul A. Newman, Chief Financial Officer, The New
Piper Aircraft, Inc.) [hereinafter "Newman Testimony"]. In July 1991, Piper filed
for Chapter 11 reorganization and stayed there for four years. It laid off virtually
its entire workforce. Id.
21 THE NATIONAL COMMISSION

TO ENSURE A STRONG COMPETITIVE AiRLINE IN-

A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 26 (Aug. 1993) [hereinafter
"Presidential Commission Report"].
22 Oberstar Statement, supra note 18.

DUSTRY,

23 Id.
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dustry's decline was the skyrocketing cost of products liability. 4
A fundamental contribution to this escalating cost was the socalled "long tail" of liability. 25 Tens of thousands of aircraft had
been sold in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. But by the mid1980s, fewer than a thousand planes were sold each year. The
cost of those planes had to cover an ever-growing liability exposure that arose from planes sold in the distant and very distant
past. 26 Executives from the general aviation industry testified
that relief from the "long tail" of liability "would revitalize the
industry and result in an increase in jobs, enable manufacturers
to spend more on research and development, and enhance
'2
manufacturers' ability to compete with foreign companies.
The hearings demonstrated that high product liability costs
were driving manufacturers out of business. For example, in
1986, Cessna, the world's largest producer of piston-powered
aircraft, closed its piston engine lines because of the high liability costs. Between 1965 and 1982, Cessna invested between $20
million and $25 million each year in research and development.28 Cessna halted piston engine research in 1986 but spent
$20 million to $25 million each year thereafter defending products liability cases.29 In other words, it spent about $160 million
over 8 years to defend lawsuits involving aircraft as much as 47
years old."0 At the request of the House Aviation Subcommittee,
Beech Aircraft Corporation conducted a study of airplane
crashes in one four-year period. Of 203 crashes, all of which
were investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) or the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), not one
was attributable to a design or manufacturing defect. Yet the
average claim was $10 million, and the manufacturer was forced
Newman Testimony, supra note 20.
Bolen Testimony, supra note 8.
26 See Newman Testimony, supra note 20. For example, by 1987 the major
manufacturers calculated that their costs for products liability per general aviation product unit ranged from $70,000 to $100,000. See Martin, supra note 8, at
483; see also GAO General Aviation Report, supra note 5, at 18 (discussing the rise
in lawsuits against the general aviation industry after the introduction of the strict
liability doctrine).
27 Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 124, 131 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2000) (citing H.R. RFP. No. 103-525, pt. 1, at 1641 (1994)).
28 Boswell & Coats, supra note 19, at 574 n.115 (citing Meyer, supra note 19, at
24

25

2).
Id.
s0140
29

CONG.

Rep. Fish).

Ruc. H4998-02, H4999 (daily ed. June 27, 1994) (statement of
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to spend an average of $530,000 defending each accident. 3'
What government investigators established as "zero-defect performance"32 ended up costing Beech over $100 million in legal
fees over four years.33
This kind of potential liability made it difficult for these companies to afford insurance. In 1985, insurers began to withdraw
product liability coverage for general aviation manufacturers. 4
"We are quite prepared to insure the risks of aviation, but not
the risks of the American legal system," one prominent Lloyd's
aviation underwriter said.3 5 By 1987, Piper was "entirely uninsured" for its product liability exposure, Cessna was uninsured
for the first $100 million annual aggregate loss, and Beech Aircraft was self-insured for losses and defense costs up to $50 million a year.3
After the insurance industry stopped writing insurance for
general aviation manufacturers, the manufacturers' only remaining method of paying these claims was to increase product
prices for consumers.17 During the Senate debate on GARA,
Sen. Hutchison of Texas said that the cost of product liability is
"directly reflected in the price of the product; Beech Aircraft
estimates that the costs of litigation added $70,000 to the cost of
each new aircraft.""H The chairman of Cessna estimated that the
cost of liability insurance on an airplane that sold for $85,000
was between $40,000 and $50,000, and that covering the cost of
liability had become the highest single expense of the airplane. 9 This cost was passed on to consumers in the form of
M' See Martin, supra note 8, at 483-84; Clinger Statement, supra note 12; Bolen
Testimony, supra note 8.
3 SeeA Need at the Point of Crisis, supra note 7, at 4; Martin, supra note 8, at
483-84.
33 See Martin, supra note 8, at 483-84; Clinger Statement, supra note 12; Bolen
Testimony, supra note 8.
54 Kister, supra note 13, at 110-11; Boswell & Coats, supra note 19, at 549.
.'5 Boswell & Coats, supra note 19, at 549 (citing Martin, supra note 8, at 48384); Kister, supra note 13, at 111 (same).
36 See Martin, supra note 8, at 483-84. Although products liability was not the
only reason Piper Aircraft went into bankruptcy in the early 1990s-some argued
it was severely overstaffed-the uninsured posture the company assumed due to
the cost of liability insurance rendered the company unfundable through traditional financing sources. Suma Outlines Plansfor New Models, New Technology from
the New PiperAircraft, WKLY. Bus. AVIATION, Aug. 7, 1995, at 55.
37 See Boswell & Coats, supra note 19, at 550.
38 140 CONG. REC. S2995, S2996 (daily ed. March 15, 1994).
39 See supra note 13, at 112 (citing David J. Moffitt, The Implications of Tort Reform
for General Aviation, 10J. AIR & SPACE L. 8, at n.6 (1995)).
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higher prices. The increase in prices of new aircraft deterred
some consumers from buying at all and caused other consumers
to turn to less expensive used aircraft.' The decline in sales
further increased the prices that suppliers had to charge to stay
in business, creating a vicious cycle.41
The American Association of Trial Lawyers (ATLA) was the
primary opponent to general aviation tort reform. 42 ATLA testified that a number of factors unrelated to tort liability contributed to the sales decline. The identified factors included tax law
changes, including elimination of the investment tax credit and
imposition of a 10 percent luxury tax (since repealed); increased industry emphasis on more profitable private jets; competition from unassembled "kit" versions of piston-engine
aircraft; availability of high quality used aircraft; widely available
commercial flights; and a decline in trained pilots. 4: ATLA also

said that the existing aircraft were of too high a quality, thus
contributing to lengthy, durable and reliable service lives. 4
ATLA argued that litigation threats encouraged manufacturers
to emphasize safety in the design, testing and manufacturing
process, and that reform merely would reduce costs to the industry by wrongfully taking money from deserving plaintiffs.

45

40 Barron's reported an amazing example of the increased price: "A small
Beechcraft aimed at the private recreational market listed for $26,550 in 1974.
Today, Beech's smallest plane is a little bigger than the '74 model, but it lists for
$255,800." Thomas G. Donlan, Fallingfrom the Sky: Unlimited Liability Claims Destroy an American Industry, BARRON'S, Feb. 21, 1994, at 10.
41 See Martin, supra note 8, at 483. The number of pilot licenses and the number of hours flown in general aviation declined steadily between 1980 and 1994.
For example, the number of student pilot licenses decreased more than one
third, from 150,000 in 1980 to 96,000 in 1994. GAO General Aviation Report,
supra note 5, at 5.
42 See Anton, supra note 11, at 773; Patrick J. Shea, Solving America's General
Aviation Crisis: The Advantages of FederalPreemption Over Tort Reform, 80 CORNELL L.
REv. 747, 781-82 (1995).
43 Bruce Kuhse, Products Liability Law in Aviation Mishaps; Florida's 1999 Tort
Reform Legislation and the GeneralAviation RevitalizationAct of 1994, 74-AUG FL\. B.
J. 22, 24 (2000).
44 Id.; H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 2.
45 See Limiting Liability for Small Aircrafts: Hearing on H.R. 3087 and S.1458 Before
the Economic and Commercial Law SubComm. of the House Judiciary Comm., 103d
Cong. (1994) (statement of Charles T. Hvass,Jr.); Boswell & Coats, supra note 19,
at 552 (discussing the sharp decline in the number of fatal general aviation accidents per 100,000 flight hours between 1950 and 1969, despite the fact that modern products liability had not yet been developed or gained wide acceptance);
Kuhse, supra note 43, at 24. Kuhse noted that while factors such as fuel price
increases, airline deregulation and tax law changes appeared to contribute to the
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Other factors cited as contributing to a decline in general aviation included oversaturation of the market when more than
14,000 single-engine planes were built in 1978, combined with
the generally poor economic conditions of the early 1980s.46
Experts generally agreed, however, that the dramatic rise in
costs due to product liability exposure and related manufacturer
product insurance premiums were a significant cause of the industry's decline.47
In 1993, five years after Congress first attempted to address
the industry problem, the National Commission to Ensure a
Strong Competitive Airline Industry studied the decline in the
general aviation industry. The Commission found that "although the U.S. remains a world leader in production and sale
of business jets, production of light piston aircraft has been reduced to a trickle by the enormous ongoing cost of open-ended
product liability. '48 The Commission noted that: "Many factors
are at play, but the added costs of liability insurance forced
prices up, causing sharply increased costs for personal and
short-range business flying.

'49

This finding by an objective body

helped move GARA forward in Congress.
B.

FINDING A SOLUTION

Some states had enacted legislative solutions for problems
caused by excessive tort liability in general, "but they were not
universal, and the inconsistencies from state to state caused
general aviation industry's downturn, other anti-GARA arguments lacked the support of any rational cause-and-effect relationship, such as the:
availability of 'build it yourself kit aircraft (the homebuilt 'experimental' aircraft demanded mechanical and construction skills beyond the ability of most pilots plus required thousands of hours of
'free time' labor); demand for used aircraft (simple economics
would indicate that as the prices for new aircraft shot up, the demand for lower priced used aircraft would also increase); [and a]
shortage of trained pilots (does a shortage of trained pilots cause a
lack of demand for low end single-engine training aircraft or does
the high cost of new aircraft cause a shortage of trained pilots?).
Kuhse, supra note 43, at 24.
46 See Scott E. Tarry & Lawrence J. Truitt, Rhetoric and Reality: Tort Reform and
the UncertainFuture of General Aviation, 61 J.AIR L. & COM. 163, 167, 192 (1995).
47 See id. at 193; Kister, supra note 13, at 111; GAO General Aviation Report,
supra note 5, at 24-27.
48 Presidential Commission Report, supra note 21, at 26.
49 Id.
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more problems. ' 50 The need for a uniform approach called out
for a federal legislative solution. Members of Congress from
Kansas, the headquarters of many general aviation aircraft manufacturers, spearheaded the effort at federal aviation tort reform, particularly Sen. Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kan.) and Rep.
Dan Glickman (D-Kan.), Rep. James Hansen (R-Utah), and Sen.
John McCain (R-Ariz.) also played a critical role.
Most members of Congress recognized that there was a legitimate jurisdictional basis for federal legislation because the federal government heavily regulates all aspects of the general
aviation industry "from cradle to grave."' General aviation aircraft must meet rigid standards set by the Federal Aviation Administration. " Before any aircraft flies for the first time, it must
be inspected and certified as airworthy by the FAA. If it is to be
produced in any number, the aircraft must meet a further set of
FAA-prescribed criteria.5
The initial proposals for aviation industry liability reform covered many tort issues." As originally introduced by Sen. Kassebaum and approved by the Senate Commerce Committee in
1986, general aviation reform would have done a number of
things. It would have: (1) created a single body of nationwide
substantive law for aviation liability, including uniform standards of negligence; (2) limited punitive damages; (3) modified
comparative negligence; (4) altered the rules of evidence in
general aviation cases to explicitly provide that plaintiffs cannot
present evidence of subsequent remedial measures; (5) abolished joint and several liability; (6) created a two-year federal
statute of limitations for bringing liability actions; and (7) al50 William L. Oliver, Jr. & Michael G. Jones, Repose Statute Helps Revitalise an
American Industry: the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), AVIATION
Q. 245, 246 (1997); see also Christopher C. McNatt, Jr. & Steven L. England, The
Push for Statutes of Repose in General Aviation, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 323, 327-28 (1995)
(analyzing state statutes of repose in existence at the time of passage of GARA
and explaining why Congressional action was necessary to provide uniformity in
the area of general aviation accidents).
51H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 2, at 5.
52 See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. App. §§1301 et seq. (Titles VI, VII
and IX specifically).
53 See Shea, supra note 42, at 750-55 (discussing the scope and history of federal
regulation of the general aviation industry); GAO General Aviation Report, supra
note 5, at 18-21 (same).
54 In the years prior to GARA, Congress considered a variety of bills that dealt
with tort reform, in general, and product liability reform, in general. These bills
were not passed, the votes splitting mainly along party lines. See Oliver & Jones,
supra note 50, at 246.
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lowed automatic removal of cases to federal courts as well as a
statute of repose (originally sought to be 12 years). 5 5 This comprehensive approach did not prove to be politically viable. 6

While various legislative proposals garnered support from
large groups of legislators, "the bills invariably died in committee, usually in the House Judiciary Committee, which during this

time was chaired by Rep.
[Jack] Brooks (D-Tex.), a strong oppo57
nent of tort reform.
In 1993, counsel to the General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) suggested that a broader approach could not
be successful and asked GAMA's president to select one issue
that would be the most important to GAMA's members. The
president selected a statute of repose, which would address the
long-tail liability problem and substantially reduce insurance
risks for GAMA members. As a result, GAMA's Congressional

supporters introduced a bill with a single provision for a 15-year
statute of repose. The new bill gained significantly more political support than prior legislative efforts. 5 To garner the consensus necessary to obtain clearance for consideration and
approval in the Senate, the bill was further modified to extend
the statute of repose period to 18 years.5 'j Exceptions were added to exempt cases involving misrepresentations to the FAA
and written warranties."'
-55 See S. 2794, 99th Cong. (1986).
Sen. Kassebaum subsequently introduced
similar legislation in five consecutive terms of Congress. Shea, supra note 42, at
768 (citing a telephone interview with Mike Horak, press secretary to Sen. Kassebaum, Nov. 10, 1994)).
56 See, e.g., S. RUp. No. 101-303, at 2 (1990) (the Senate Judiciary Committee
issued an adverse report on general aviation legislation, concluding, inter alia,
that "[t]he General Aviation Accident Liability Standards Act [S. 640] should not
be passed by the Senate and enacted into law. The bill has not been proven to be
necessary and would represent an unwise policy decision on the part of the Senate, if adopted. Further, a number of the specific substantive provisions of the
bill are so problematic that the entire bill is fatally flawed.").
57 See Oliver & Jones, supra note 50, at 246.
58 See id. at 246-47.
59 Instead of the uniform 18-year statute of repose imposed by the 1994 Act, an
amendment introduced by Rep. Rick Boucher (R-Va.) proposed a sliding scale,
three-pronged approach. See 140 CONG. REC. H4998-02, H5000 (daily ed. June
27, 1994). For piston-powered aircraft, the amendment provided a repose period
of 15 years; for turboprop-powered aircraft, the repose period would have been
18 years; and for jet-powered and other remaining general aviation aircraft, the
repose period would have been 22 years. Id.
60 The House version of the legislation further clarified that it would only apply to limit suits brought against general aviation manufacturers in their capacity
as manufacturers.
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GARA's supporters emphasized to Congress that if the federal
statute of repose passed, it would likely spur general aviation
production and create new jobs. Russ Meyer, Chairman of
Cessna Aircraft, promised that "Cessna would open a new piston-engine manufacturing facility and resume piston-engine
production if GARA was passed."'" Moreover, all aspects of the
general aviation industry supported GARA."2
Aircraft owners and their trade association, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), were key players in the political support for the bill. AOPA's members, the pilots, were the
potential plaintiffs if there were an airplane accident resulting
in injury or death. AOPA's membership was in effect a "consumer group" who would lose existing legal rights if the bill
were enacted. When ATLA argued that the bill was "anti-consumer," AOPA's members said otherwise. The combination of
AOPA's support, the bill's narrow approach, and its packaging
as a 'jobs bill" gave GARA a much greater chance of passage
than earlier, more comprehensive proposals."
Still, the bill appeared to be stuck in the House Judiciary
Committee until certain House members invoked rarely used
parliamentary procedures that essentially forced Chairman
Brooks to allow the bill to be reported out of his committee."4
The bill was passed overwhelmingly by the House. The Senate,
with a 91-8 vote, had already passed a nearly identical bill.65
On the Senate floor, proponents rejected newly proposed
changes, except to allow claims brought by people injured on
the ground by a plane. Proponents accepted the "not on the
plane" exception for two reasons. First, people who might be
injured on the ground were not in AOPA, the group of pilots
that had accepted the liability limitations in the bill. Second,
See Oliver & Jones, supra note 50, at 247.
See H.R. REP. No. 103-525 pt. 1, at 3; H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 2, at 5-6.
GARA had a broad base of support within the general aviation industry, drawing
praise from the General Aviation Manufacturers Association, Aircraft Owners and
Pilots Association, the Experimental Aircraft Association, the International Association of Machinists, the Helicopter Association International, the National Business Aircraft Association, and the National Air Transportation Association.
Opponents to the legislation were the American Trial Lawyers' Association and
consumer organizations like Citizen Action and Public Citizen. See McNatt & England, supra note 50, at 326-27.
63 See Oliver & Jones, supra note 50, at 247.
64 See id.
65 See H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 1, at 2; President's Signing Statement, supra
note 3, at 1678.
61

62
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the number of claims brought by persons on the ground was
likely to be very few in number, so this exception would not
greatly affect the impact of the bill's liability limit action. The
differences between the House and Senate bills were quickly
smoothed out in the conference committee.6 6
The Administration reviewed the legislation. ATLA had provided very strong (and early) opposition to the GARA bill, and
the Administration had, in general, been opposed to tort reform. GARA supporters had a lucky break, however, when the
White House sent the bill to the Department of Justice for its
review. The bill ended up on the desk of Frank Hunger, Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division of the Department
of Justice. Mr. Hunger was a long-time pilot and understood
how and why excessive liability had devastated the aviation industry. He recommended that President Clinton sign the bill.
The President did so on August 17, 1994.
III.

THE SUCCESS OF GARA

By the time GARA was enacted, the general aviation industry
had experienced a 95 percent decline in production and a loss
of more than 100,000jobs during the preceding decade. Since
the passage of GARA, general aviation production lines have
opened and expanded.17 More than 25,000 manufacturing jobs
have been created. 68 Thousands of additional jobs have been
created in other segments of the general aviation industry and
the industries that support it.69 Jane F. Garvey, Administrator of
the Federal Aviation Administration, said: "Thanks in large part
to the General Aviation Revitalization Act, the general aviation
industry is now in better shape than it has been in more than a
decade. '717 The United States General Accounting Office reported in 2001 that GARA was "the most significant contributor"
to a rise in general aviation manufacturing. 1
66 See Oliver & Jones, supra note 50, at 247.
67 See General Aviation Manufacturers Association, Five Year Results: A Report to
the President and Congress on the GeneralAviation Revitalization Act (1999) [hereinafter "Five Year Results"].
68 Id.
69 Id.; see also GAO General Aviation Report, supra note 5, at 65 (stating that in
1998, general aviation generated $64.5 billion in economic activity at the national
level).
70 Five Year Results, supra note 67.
71 See GAO General Aviation Report, supra note 5, at 6. In addition to GARA,
experts attributed the growth in manufacturing indicators and less-strong growth
in other indicators to the strong economy and the popularity of a new type of
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General aviation's contribution to the national economy has
grown in the past decade. In 1998, general aviation generated
about $64.5 billion in total economic activity at the national
level, an increase of $26.5 billion from the 1988 level of $38 billion. 2 Since the enactment of GARA, revenues from the export
of general aviation aircraft have more than doubled, boosting
the U.S. economy and the balance of trade. ' As its president
promised Congress, Cessna resumed manufacture of single-engine piston aircraft after GARA was enacted. Cessna constructed a new production facility in Independence, Kansas, and
began delivery of the new aircraft in early 1997. Cessna alone
has shipped 3,000 units since it reopened its single-engine piston production lines in 1996. TM Similarly, Charles M. Suma,
president and chief executive officer of The New Piper Aircraft,
Inc., said: "There is not one single company, government
agency or individual that knows the significance of GARA more
than The New Piper Aircraft, Inc ... we are living proof. We are
The New Piper because of GARA and its limiting effect on the
enormous product liability tail."7 5 With regard to the general
aviation aircraft industry as a whole, annual shipments of new
aircraft tripled between 1994 and 2000, from 928 to 2,816. 7"
Investment in research and development by general aviation
companies has grown by more than 150 percent since GARA was
passed.7 7 Gary Burrell, president of Garmin International, Inc.,
said: "GARA has been a catalyst to encourage companies such as
GARMIN to invest in general aviation. 78 Opponents of the
GARA bill suspected that its enactment would mean that the
new planes would not be safe. Exactly the opposite result has
occurred. For example, Unison Industries has developed at
least five new safety products since GARA was enacted. "None of
aircraft ownership called fractional ownership, in which individuals or companies
purchase a share in an aircraft for their occasional use. See GAO General Aviation Report, supra note 5, at 4, 6.
72 See id. at 13 (citing WILBUR SMITIi ASSOCIATES & APPLIED MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS, INC., The Economic Impact Of Civil Aviation On The U.S. Economy 2000 (Mar. 2000) (prepared for FAA and MCA Research Corp.) and WILBUR
SMITii ASSOCIATES, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CIVILt AvIATION ON THE U.S. ECONOMY (June 1989)).
73 GAO General Aviation Report, supra note 5, at 13.
74 See id. at 28.
75 See General Aviation Manufacturers Association, Report to the President and
Congress: The Results of the General Aviation Revitalization Act (1996).
76 See GAO General Aviation &eport, supra note 5, at 4.
77 See id. at 28.
78 Five Year Results, supra note 67.
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our new developments would have been done without it," said
President Frederick B. Sontag."'
General aviation flying activity indicators such as hours flown
and number of pilot licenses also rose after the enactment of
GARA.811 Robert Baker, vice chairman of American Airlines,
Inc., said, "The commercial airline industry draws the majority
of its pilots from general aviation. We need a healthy general
aviation industry producing pilots."'" At the same time, the
safety of general aviation has been improving. The total number of accidents declined from 3,233 in 1982 to 1,989 in 1998 a decrease of 41 percent - while the accident rate fell from
about 10 to about 7 accidents for every 100,000 flight hours.82
IV.

WHAT DOES GARA DO?

GARA is elegant in its simplicity. Simply put, it is "a classic
statute of repose." 3 Under GARA, a person can sue the manufacturer of a general aviation aircraft for injuries that occur anytime in the 18 years after the date that the plane is placed into
the stream of commerce. 4 If an accident occurs one day before
the GARA period runs, an action will be possible and will be
governed by the usual statute of limitations. If it occurs on the
day after the GARA period runs, no action is possible."
This represents a policy judgment by Congress that the aircraft is considered to be not defective or not negligently designed as a matter of law if it has been in successful use for
almost two decades before the accident. If a general aviation
aircraft has flown safely for 18 years and is involved in an acciv.Id. Sontag testified before Congress in 1993 that Unison scrapped an advanced electronic ignition project for light aircraft because the company was concerned about the liability risk. See The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1993:
Hearings on H.R. 3087 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public
Works & Transp., 103d Cong. (1993) (statement of Frederick B. Sontag, President
of Unison Industries).
80 See GAO General Aviation Report, supra note 5, at 4, 33.
s See Five Year Results, supra note 67.
82 See GAO General Aviation Report, supra note 5, at 5.
83 Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A., 252 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2001).
84 A statute of repose is different from a statute of limitations. A statute of
limitations provides a set time after the injury or discovery of the injury for a
lawsuit to be filed. Some so-called statutes of repose measure their time periods
from the date of delivery of the product (or occurrence of the act) to the time of
the filing of the lawsuit, rather than the time of the accident when the injury
occurred. Such statutes often appear in conjunction with statutes of limitation
and are hybrids between repose and limitation statutes.
85 Lyon, 252 F.3d at 1084.
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dent after this period, it is highly likely that the cause of that
accident was not related to the aircraft's warnings or design., 6
Rather, the highly probable causes are pilot error, improper
modification or maintenance by fixed-based operators (such as
repair and service personnel), weather, or other causes. A study
by the General Accounting Office found that more than twothirds of general aviation accidents between 1994 and 1998 were
caused by pilot error, including mistakes related to procedure,
skill, and judgment.8" Mechanical failures were involved in 13
percent of the fatal accidents and 25 percent of the nonfatal
accidents.8 8 The remaining accidents were due to other factors
such as misdirections from air traffic control.8 9
Congress recognized that components of general aviation aircraft are from time to time replaced, and therefore GARA provides an 18-year "rolling statute of repose" for new or
replacement parts. Under this provision, the repose period for
claims based on injuries relating to the new part begins running
on the date the replacement or addition is completed, while
claims for injuries based on the rest of the aircraft are subject to
the original statute of repose.
GARA includes four exceptions to the statute of repose. First
is an exception for fraud. This exception applies where the
manufacturer knowingly misrepresented, withheld or concealed
certain information during the regulatory process. The next
two exceptions focus on potential plaintiffs who did not make
the decision to ride on the aircraft: the "medical emergency"
exception and the "not aboard the aircraft" exception. Finally,
Congress created the "warranty" exception in recognition of the
fact that a manufacturer and a purchaser of a general aviation
aircraft may wish to negotiate a longer warranty.9 ° GARA's statute of repose provides meaningful national protection. It
preempts state law to the extent state law provides for a longer

The statute of repose approach was particularly appropriate for addressing
the general aviation industry's downturn. By the time most general aviation aircraft are 15 years old they have had at least three major engine overhauls and
have accumulated 6,000 hours of flying time. "The theory of the statute of repose
is that such use ought to demonstrate the safety of the basic design." Donlan,
supra note 40, at 10.
87 See GAO General Aviation Report, supra note 5, at 8, 53-55.
86

88 See id.
89 See id.

90 GARA, § 2(b).
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period of repose, but does not displace a state statute of repose
that provides for a shorter period.91
V. WHO CAN INVOKE GARA?
The protection provided by GARA is limited to manufacturers
of general aviation aircraft and their component parts. Therefore, in order to invoke the statute of repose, defendants must
meet certain threshold requirements set forth in the statute.
They must be manufacturers of general aviation aircraft or their
component parts, and, at the time of the accident, the aircraft
must not have been engaged in "scheduled passenger-carrying
operations." Defendants who satisfy these requirements should
plead GARA as an affirmative defense.92
A.

WHO IS A "MANUFACTURER"?

GARA can be asserted only by manufacturers of general aviation aircraft or component parts, not by other entities.93 To
date, courts have rejected attempts by plaintiffs to narrowly define "manufacturer" as the original manufacturer and thus narrowly restrict the application of the statute of repose. As a
result, successors-in-interest to the original manufacturer have
been allowed to raise the GARA defense,94 as have agents of the
manufacturer. 95 Arguably, other entities that satisfy state law definitions of "manufacturer" may be able to raise the defense as
wellU' 6

!I Id. § 2(d).
92 In Tucker v. Hiller Aviation, No. CV 752984 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara Cty.,
May 2, 2000), the court denied Textron Lycoming's motion for summary judgment based on GARA because the defendant failed to raise the GARA defense in
its Answer. The defendant alleged only that the case was barred by the statute of
limitations.
93 GARA § 2(a).
94 See, e.g., Burroughs, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 124; Mason v. Saddler, No. LACV
032793 (Iowa Dist. Ct., Linn Cty., Feb. 23, 2000).
95 See, e.g., Butler v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., No. BC 206780 (consolidated) (L.A. Super. Ct., Apr. 16, 2001).
96 In Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., No. C98-5579RJB (W.D. Wash. Feb.
14, 2000), the court looked to state law in determining that Bell was the manufacturer of the military surplus helicopter at issue. Bell had originally manufactured
the helicopter for the Navy. Id. at 9 (holding that "[a]pplying the law set forth in
Issue 2, above [RCW 7.72.010(1) and (2)], the record is clear that Bell is the
manufacturer of the helicopter at issue here.").
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Successor Manufacturers

Plaintiffs have argued that only the actual manufacturer of the
allegedly defective product or part can assert the GARA defense,
not "successor manufacturers," such as companies that bought
out a manufacturer's product lines.9 7 This argument has met
with little success. Courts have allowed successor defendants to
rely on GARA. Judges have acknowledged that GARA will be
eviscerated if its protections are not extended to the successors
of the actual manufacturers. This result is consistent with the
statute's legislative history, which shows that Congress knew the
aviation industry was going through a series of mergers and acquisitions and chose not to exempt successors from the reach of
GARA.98 This result is also consistent with state court decisions
applying statutes of repose to bar claims against successor manufacturers when the claim against the original manufacturer is
barred ."
In deciding whether a defendant should be considered to be
a "manufacturer," courts have looked to whether that defendant
has to comply with FAA regulations imposing duties on the manufacturer. This is reasonable, as GARA incorporates FAA regula97 S ee, e.g., Burroughs, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 124; Mason v. Saddler, No. LACV 032793,
at 4.
98 For example, Sen. Hollings, a principal opponent to GARA, argued that the
"industry is doing extremely well." 140 CONG. REC. S2438-02 (1994). By way of
example, he stated that "Cessna has been bought out by Textron.... Beech
Aircraft, Raytheon bought it .... " Id. Similarly, David Katzman, a leading plaintiffs' aviation attorney, testified before the House Public Works Committee:
"Cessna is owned by Textron. It was recently sold to Textron, I believe, by General Dynamics for something to the tune of $100 million." General Aviation RevitalizationAct of 1993: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on
Public Works & Transp., 103d Cong. 70 (1993).
99 See, e.g., Allison v. ITE Imperial Corp., 729 F. Supp. 45, 46 (S.D. Miss. 1990)
(finding that the Tennessee statute of repose bars claims against the manufacturer's successor); Henry v. Raynor Mfg. Co., 753 F. Supp. 278, 279-80 (D. Minn.
1990) (finding that the Minnesota statute of repose bars claims against the manufacturer's successor); Gardener v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 571 N.E.2d 1107,
1108, 1114 (Ill. App. 1991) (finding that the Illinois statute of repose bars claims
against the manufacturer's successor); Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marlette
Homes, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 611, 612 n.1 (Mich. 1998) (noting that the Michigan
statute of repose bars claims against the manufacturer's successors); Jackson v.
Coldspring Terrace Property Owners Ass'n, 939 S.W.2d 762, 764, 768-69 (Tex.
App. 1997, writ denied) (stating that the Texas statute of repose bars claims
against a franchise when claims against the franchisee manufacturer are barred).
Accord Denman v. Snapper Division, 131 F.3d 546, 547 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating
that the North Carolina statute of repose bars claims against the manufacturer's
successor).
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tions throughout its statutory scheme. For example, GARA
explicitly incorporates FAA regulations in determining what is a
general aviation aircraft.'0 0 Moreover, one of the GARA exceptions involves instances where a manufacturer has knowingly
misrepresented or concealed from the FAA "required information" relating to "obligations with respect to continuing airworthiness" of an aircraft.'0 ' The application of this exception
requires a court to determine whether a given defendant had
the obligation to comply with relevant FAA regulations.
Therefore, in Burroughs,"2 the plaintiffs alleged that a malfunctioning 25-year-old carburetor caused the airplane crash.
They sued an aircraft parts manufacturer that did not manufacture or sell the carburetor model at issue. The defendant had
merely acquired the carburetor product line from its predecessor, which in turn had acquired the product line from the actual
manufacturer. The California appellate court ruled that the defendant-successor was a "manufacturer" for purposes of GARA,
and upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment."' - The
court explained that although the defendant did not actually
manufacture the carburetor, it had taken over the manufacturer's regulatory responsibilities for the product line at issue.
The court said:
GARA contains an implicit recognition that as a matter of federal
law, by virtue of the extensive rules and regulations governing
the aviation industry, a successor manufacturer steps into the
shoes of the predecessor with regard to the duties of reporting
defects ...The federal regulatory scheme contemplates that at
all times there will be a designated OEM [original equipment
manufacturer] for an aircraft part or component, burdened with
the reporting duties and responsibilities as to that particular
product. 104
Because the defendant-successor had become the entity responsible for issuing maintenance manuals and bulletins and
fulfilling the manufacturer's obligations for continued airworthiness, the court said, "[i]n the eyes of the FAA, [the defendant0' 5
successor] was the 'new manufacturer' of the ... carburetor."'
See GARA, § 2(c).
,m See id. § 2 (b)(1).
102 Burroughs, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 124.
1(3Id. at 133.
100

104

Id.

105 ld.
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The court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that the rules of
successor liability under California law applied and allowed the
claim. The court refused to interpret GARA by reference to
state law: "Because of the preemptive reach of GARA ... California law relating to successor liability does not govern if it would
allow a claim otherwise barred by GARA."' 6 Otherwise, the
court said, GARA would be subject to the vagaries of differing
state statutes and the uniform protection created by the Act
0 7
would be nullified.1
2.

Agents of Manufacturers

In Butler v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., plaintiffs filed suit for
injuries arising out of a helicopter crash allegedly caused by a
defective tail rotor yoke assembly. 0 8 The "retirement life" of
the helicopter's tail rotor yoke was increased during the repose
period from 4,000 hours to 5,000 hours. Because of this change,
a 4,000-hour yoke that had been retired from use was tested and
reinstalled on the helicopter one year before the accident. In
addition to suing the helicopter manufacturer, plaintiffs sued an
individual and a company that tested the yoke to determine
whether to extend its useful life. Drawing an analogy to the Burroughs court's use of GARA to bar claims against a successor
manufacturer, the Butler court rejected the plaintiff's arguments
that these two defendants were not entitled to rely on GARA
because they did not manufacture the helicopter involved in the
accident. The Butler court explained: "[I] n acting with regard to
providing for testing the yoke for the purpose of possibly extending its retirement life, they were performing acts as agents
for [the manufacturer]. Had [the manufacturer] done the
work itself, such conduct would constitute performance of functions as a manufacturer."' 9
3. Distributors,Sellers, Lessors
GARA does not explicitly include general aviation aircraft distributors, sellers and lessors, but, under state law, such entities
may be able to assert all defenses available to the manufacturer,
Id. at 132 n.7.
See id.
108 Butler v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., No. BC 206780 (consolidated) (L.A.
Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 2001), at 3.
lob Id. at 8.
106

107
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including GARA."I 0 (This assumes that the defendants also can
establish they are acting in the capacity of a manufacturer, as
required by the statute.''') Some states may include all entities
in the chain of distribution in their definition of manufacturer
for products liability purposes. For example, the term "manufacturer" is defined under the California Business and Professions Code to include any "distributor of a manufacturer who
sells, transfers, or exchanges an appliance to or with a retailer. ' "2 Defendants meeting that definition could argue that
GARA protections apply to them as well. Moreover, a number
of states also have their own statutes of repose that may be asserted by non-manufacturers in the chain of distribution. 1 3
Similarly, non-OEM rebuilders and overhaulers who rebuild
component parts such as engines and thus return them to their
original specifications may be treated in some states as manufacturers for purposes of strict liability law." 4 Most states do not
recognize strict liability claims filed against defendants who
merely performed repairs, but they do recognize strict liability
claims against dealers."'1
4.

ManufacturerActing in its Capacity as a Manufacturer

GARA applies only if the lawsuit is brought against a manufacturer in its capacity as a manufacturer.'" The House Judiciary
Committee Report explained that this "is intended to ensure
that parties who happen to be manufacturers of an aircraft or a
component part are not immunized from liability they may be
subject to in some other capacity." '"I I Increasingly, manufacturers are becoming involved in certain maintenance programs reIl See Robert F. Hedrick, A Close and CriticalAnalysis of the New GeneralAviation
Revitalization Act, 62J. AIR L. & CoM. 385, 397 (1996)
II See supra note 93.
12 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22410(b) (West 1987).
13See Hedrick, supra note 110, at 397; see also McNatt & England, supra note
50, at 327-42 (listing state statutes of repose in effect at the time GARA passed).
114 See Anderson v. Olmstead Util. Equip. Inc., 573 N.E.2d 626, 629 (Ohio
1991) (stating "strict liability applies with equal force to a commercial entity engaged in remanufacturing or rebuilding a defective product"); Michalko v.
Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 451 A.2d 179, 182 (N.J. 1982) (stating that a party
who "undertakes to rebuild part of a machine in accordance with the specifications of the owner" can be held strictly liable).
115 Some have argued that GARA prevents dealers from spreading their damages to manufacturers through joint and several liability. See Kister, supra note
13, at 114-15; Hedrick, supra note 110 at 404 n.94 (listing jurisdictions).
I1 GARA § 2(a).
17 H. R. REp. No. 103-525, pt. 2, at 7.
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lated to their own aircraft, and many component part
manufacturers offer overhaul and rebuilding services. 1 8 Congress recognized this, explaining that, under GARA, "[flor example, in the event a party who happened to be a manufacturer
committed some negligent act as a mechanic of an aircraft or as
a pilot, and such act was a proximate cause of an accident, the
victims would not be barred from bringing a civil suit for damages against that party in its capacity as a mechanic."' 19
In Burroughs, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
their claim was based on Precision's allegedly negligent service,
maintenance, and repair of the carburetor.' 2° The court acknowledged that "if the manufacturer committed a negligent act
repairing or servicing an aircraft or as a pilot, and such act was
the proximate cause of an accident, the victims would not be
barred from bringing suit against the manufacturer acting in a
capacity other than as a manufacturer."'' 2 The court observed,
however, that plaintiffs' pleadings and arguments focused on
Precision's role and duties as a manufacturer. The court's review
of the record found no evidence that Precision ever acted in any
capacity other than as a manufacturer carrying out its obliga22
tions to ensure airworthiness.1
In Mason v. Saddler, the plaintiff sought to avoid GARA by
characterizing Schweizer, a defendant (a successor to the original helicopter manufacturer), as a "maintenance support entity."'1 23 The plaintiff argued that the crash was proximately
caused by Schweizer's negligent failure to include certain information in its maintenance support materials. The Iowa state
court found that Schweizer was a manufacturer entitled to assert
the GARA defense because Schweizer had assumed the duties of
the manufacturer of the helicopter when it acquired the type
124
certificate for the aircraft from the original manufacturer.
The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the rolling statute
of repose did not bar his claims for failure to warn. The court
cited a line of cases holding that claims for failure to warn of a
design flaw are subject to a statute of repose in the same way
Mar. 11, 1996, at 44-53.
19 H. R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 2, at 7.
120 Burroughs, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 124.
121 Id. at 131.

1i8 See AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,

122

Id.

v. Saddler, No. LACV 032793, at 4.
Id. at 6.

123 Mason
124
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that claims for the design flaw would be. 12 5 The case is currently
on appeal. 26 In another case, Schneider v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 12 7
the court simply stated that service manuals "are issued 'in the
capacity as a manufacturer' because a manufacturer's provision
of maintenance and repair manuals is part of the duty to warn as
a manufacturer. Any other interpretation would circumvent
GARA providing a back door to sue for a design flaw. ' 128 We
agree that these decisions find support in the legislative purpose
of GARA.
B.

WHAT IS A "GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT"?

Only general aviation aircraft are subject to GARA. The statute defines general aviation aircraft as:
any aircraft for which a type certificate or an airworthiness certificate has been issued by the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration, which, at the time such certificate was originally
issued, had a maximum seating capacity of fewer than 20 passengers, and which was not, at the time of the accident, engaged in
scheduled passenger-carrying operations as defined under regulations in effect under129the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 ... at the
time of the accident.
1.

Type and Airworthiness Certificates

One commentator has noted that GARA can be applicable to
a particular aircraft so long as a type or airworthiness certificate
was originally issued by the FAA - even if the certificate is suspended or revoked. 1 ' This appears clear from the statutory language and, according to the commentator, by the fact that the
manufacturer does not keep control over the continuing airworthiness of its aircraft after it is delivered to another party. '
Id. at 9; see infra note 234 and accompanying text.
Mason v. Schweizer Aircraft Corp., No. 00-1231 (Iowa. 2000).
127 Schneider v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 542343 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento
Cty. July 26, 1996) (consolidated).
128 Id. at 3; see also Alter v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 531, 541
n.5 (S.D. Tex 1996) (stating that under applicable state law and Section 324A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "the provision of maintenance and repair
instructions is not a separate and discreet post-sale undertaking creating a separate cause of action, but rather part of the manufacturer's duty to warn").
129 GARA, §2(c).
130 See Hedrick, supra note 110, at 390. Hedrick, now an aviation law practitioner in Washington state, provides a thorough analysis of GARA's definitional
provisions in his article. Hedrick, supra note 110, at 388-93.
131 See Hedrick, supra note 110, at 390.
125
6
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Type certificates are issued for aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers and certain other parts 1 2 once the FAA has approved
the "design, specifications, and manufacturing process"' 13 ' and
determined that each submitted part "is properly designed and
manufactured, performs properly, and meets the regulations
and minimum standards prescribed."' 3 4 Manufacturers have the
responsibility to make sure the parts at issue fully comply with
the type certificate.' 3 5
Airworthiness certificates are issued for an aircraft when the
FAA "finds that the aircraft conforms to its type certificate and,
after inspection, is in condition for safe operation."'' 3 6 They are
issued "upon request from an aircraft's registered owner, who is
typically the manufacturer before the initial sale of the
37
aircraft."
2.

Maximum Seating Capacity

At the time the original airworthiness or type certificate was
issued, the aircraft must have had a maximum seating capacity
of fewer than 20 passengers.1 "' This information is usually included in the type certificate documentation.'' Pilots and
flight crew are not considered to be "passengers" under federal
aviation regulations. 40
3.

Not Engaged in Scheduled Passenger-CarryingOperations

The regulations in effect at the time of the accident in question establish whether or not the aircraft was engaged in "scheduled passenger-carrying operations" when the accident took
place.' 4 ' The court in Reynolds v. Textron, Inc. looked to Part 135
49 U.S.C. § 44704(a)(1) (1994).
Hedrick, supra note 110, at 390.
.34 49 U.S.C. § 44704(a) (1).
135See Hedrick, supra note 110, at 390.
16 49 U.S.C. § 44704(d).
137 Hedrick, supra note 110, at 390.
138 See GARA, § (2)(c).
139See Hedrick, supra note 110, at 391-92.
140 "Passenger seating configuration" means: "[T] he total number of seats for
which the aircraft is type certificated that can be made available for passenger use
aboard a flight and includes that seat in certain airplanes which may be used by a
representative of the Administrator to conduct flight checks but is available for
revenue purposes on other occasions." 14 C.F.R. § 129.25(a)(3) (1996).
141GARA § (2) (c).
13
'33
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of the Code of Federal Regulations, 142 which defines the term as
"passenger-carrying operations that are conducted in accordance with a published schedule [,] which covers at least five
round trips per week on at least one route between two or more
points, includes dates or times (or both), and is openly advertised or 3 otherwise made readily available to the general
14
public."'
VI.
A.

HOW DOES GARA WORK?

TRIGGER OF 18-YEAR REPOSE PERIOD

GARA's 18-year repose period begins to run either upon the
date of delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser or lessee if it
comes directly from the manufacturer, or on the date of first
delivery to a person engaged in the business of selling or leasing
such aircraft.' 44 The repose period on replacement or additional parts begins to run on the date the replacement or addition is completed.145
142 143 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Relating to Defendant AVCO
Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Reynolds v. Textron, Inc.,
Case No. 3AN-96-6352 (Alaska Sup. Ct., Jan. 20, 1999) [hereinafter "Reynolds,
Findings of Fact"].
14314 C.F.R. § 135.261(b)(1)(1996).
44 GARA § 2(a)(1).
See, e.g., Reynolds, Findings of Fact, at 9 ("Here, the original Lycoming engine and its component parts were installed in an aircraft in
1968 that was delivered to its first purchaser in 1969 or 1970, more than 18 years
before the accident. Accordingly, GARA precludes claims against Textron
Lycoming relating to the original engine and its components."); Altseimer v. Bell
Helicopter Textron Inc., 919 F. Supp. 340, 342 (E.D. Cal. 1996) (finding that GARA
bars claims where the defendant provided "undisputed evidence" that the helicopter, the gearbox, and the components of the gearbox that purportedly caused

a crash all were more than 18 years old at the time of the crash); Carr v. United
Technologies Corp., No. CIV 152495 (Cal. Super. Ct., Ventura Cty., Aug. 30,
1996) (finding that claims against aircraft and component part manufacturers
are barred by GARA where the plane was delivered and the engines were installed more than 18 years before an accident); Barkley v. Textron Lycoming,
Inc., Case No. 34031 (Cal. Super. Ct. Stanislaus Cty., Sept. 18, 1996) (finding that
GARA bars claims where the aircraft was delivered to the first non-broker customer more than 18 years prior to the accident at issue). A pro-plaintiff commentator has argued that, despite the clear federal statutory language, the "date
of delivery" should be determined under state law. Some states use the date that
a product was first used for its intended purpose as the triggering date for statutes of repose, see, e.g.,
CoLo. RE'. SrAT. § 13-80-107 (2001), while other states
use the date on which the manufacturer relinquished its control of the product,
see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577a (2001).
145GARA § 2(a)(2); see Reynolds, Findings of Fact, at 9 ("GARA § 2(a)(2)
prescribes a separate 18-year limitation period for new replacement parts and
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Determining the start date for the statute of repose should be
a straightforward process. Courts in one state, though, had
clouded the issue when dealing with accidents involving surplus
military aircraft-especially helicopters.
Military aircraft typically are manufactured for direct sale to
the military. When the military is done with them, the Defense
Department sells them into the civilian market as surplus.
These surplus aircraft are very low priced, and they are often
used for tasks involving repeated heavy lifts (such as logging) for
which they were not designed. 14 As a result, surplus military
helicopters have a much higher accident rate than those experienced in general by turbine helicopters. 1 47 Even though the
aircraft are being used in jobs for which they were not designed,
the original aircraft manufacturer may be sued if the aircraft
crashes.
When a military aircraft is being used by the military, it may
not meet GARA's definition of a "general aviation aircraft." Recall that in order to be a "general aviation aircraft" under GARA,
the aircraft must have been issued a "type certificate" or an "airworthiness certificate" by the Federal Aviation Administration. 148
But military aircraft are not required to have FAA-issued type
certificates. The FAA certification requirement kicks in when
the Defense Department sells its used aircraft into the civilian
market. Once the aircraft is FAA-certified, it qualifies as a general aviation aircraft under GARA (assuming the rest of the statutory requirements are met).
GARA's express language requires that for the statute of repose to apply, the aircraft must be a general aviation aircraft at
the time of the "accident."' 149 Section 2(a) states that "no civil
action for damages . . . arising out of an accident involving a
general aviation aircraft may be brought" if the repose period has
elapsed. 5" If an aircraft is a general aviation aircraft at the time
of the accident, the 18-year statute of repose should start to run
at the time of its initial delivery-regardless of whether the aircomponents that begins to run on the date of the completion of the
replacement.").
146 See Brian Rettman, Impact of Surplus Military Helicopters,ROTOR, Winter 199798, at 34.
147 See id. (reporting that the accident rate for UH-ls in military service is 1.7
accidents per 100,000 flying hours, while the accident rate for surplus UH-ls is 26
accidents per 100,000 flying hours).
148 GARA § 2(c).
149 GARA § 2(a).
150 Id. (emphasis added).
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craft "started life" as a military aircraft or a civilian aircraft.
GARA does not contain any provision that disqualifies former
military aircraft from GARA or that delays commencement of
the statue of repose until a type certificate has been obtained
from the FAA. The statue does not require the aircraft to meet
the definition of a general aviation aircraft when it is delivered
to its first purchaser. This approach carries out the statutory
language and reflects the understanding of both GARA's proponents and opponents that the statute of repose would cover military aircraft. "
While this seems straightforward, some lower courts in Washington state ruled that the repose period for surplus military aircraft starts to run only once the used aircraft is sold into the
civilian market. 1 2 This can take place many years after the aircraft was initially delivered to its first purchaser, the military.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit resolved this hotly contested issue in Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.l15 1 In Kennedy, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the repose
15, During Senate floor debates on the bill that proposed a 15-year repose period and eventually became GARA, Sen. Heflin (one of the principal opponents
of GARA) stated: "It would appear to me that this bill might not have as much
opposition if it was limited to piston-powered aircraft. But included in it are jets,
helicopters, military planes ..
" 140 CONG. REC. S2452-02 (1994). Sen. Kassenbaum (the principal sponsor of GARA in the Senate) stated that the repose
period, "when you have gone without a manufacturing or design defect, applies
the same to piston-powered orjet-powered. I think that whether it is in the military or civilian, if you have flown a plane for 15 years and there has not been a
defect, then clearly the plane is going to survive." Id. She also rejected the argument that military aircraft should not be protected by GARA on the ground that
they are not kept in adequate repair. She said: "I think that the military is going
to keep their planes in good repair. They are constantly being flown. During any
stress tests, if they show a part needs to be replaced, it will be replaced, and a new
15-year statute of repose would go into effect." Id.
152 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. C98-5579RJB, at 7-8 (rejecting a GARA defense on the ground that the trigger date for the repose period
is when a surplus aircraft is delivered to the civilian market); Worman v. Bell
Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. 98-2-01377-7 (Thurston Cty. Super.Ct., Mar. 3,
2000) (same).
15:1 Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc, 283 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2002).
See also Butler, No. BC 206780, at 4 (noting in dicta that a former military helicopter that crashed during a municipal emergency rescue mission "was first sold and
delivered [to the Los Angeles Fire Department] 22 years before the accident").
For further discussion of this issue, see Robert F. Hedrick, Are Surplus Military
Aircraft and Parts Afforded GARA Protection?, 13-SUM AIR & SPACE LAw 10-14 (1998)
(presenting arguments as to why GARA should not apply to claims involving surplus military aircraft); Frederick C. Schafrick, Caselaw Developments under the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994: The First Five Years, The 1999 Aviation
Litigation Seminar, Aviation and Space Law Comm. of the Tort and Insurance
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period begins to run when the aircraft is initially delivered to the
military-not when it is eventually sold into the civilian market.
In Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., a surplus military helicopter crashed during logging operations. The crash occurred
26 years after the helicopter was delivered to the military-but
only 11 years after it was sold to a civilian business.15 4 The federal district court denied the defendant's motion for summary
judgment under GARA, ruling that the statute of repose had not
yet run. 55 The lower court said the statute of repose could only
be triggered once the aircraft is designated a general aviation
aircraft, i.e., when the helicopter is sold into the civilian market
and receives its first type and airworthiness certificates.' 15 Because only 11 years had passed between the FAA-certification of
the surplus helicopter at issue 15and the accident, the court said,
GARA did not bar the lawsuit. 7
The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court's approach. After finding that appeal of the GARA ruling was appropriate at
this stage of the lawsuit, 58 the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
"plain language" of GARA required that the repose period is
triggered by the initial delivery of the aircraft, even if the aircraft
15
cannot be considered a general aviation aircraft at that time. '
As the Ninth Circuit explained, the statute provides that the
limitation period starts running from "the date of delivery of the
aircraft to its first purchaser . . .I6 Section 3(1) of GARA defines the meaning of the term "aircraft" as used in GARA as
broader than the term "general aviation aircraft." GARA proLaw Practice Section of the American Bar Assoc., at 15 (Washington, D.C., Oct.
21-22, 1999) (stating that military aircraft more than 18 years old should qualify
for the GARA defense).
154 Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. C98-557-9RJB, at 3.
155 Id. at 7-8. The status of the defendant asserting the GARA defense, Bell
Helicopter, was also contested. Bell urged that it was not a product seller or
manufacturer under Washington state law. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief, at
36, Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 283 F. 3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2002) (No.
00-35240).
156 Kennedy, No. C98-557-9RJB, at 7-8.
157 Id.
158 See Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1110-11 (stating that appellate jurisdiction exists for
review of GARA ruling under the collateral order doctrine; GARA ruling was conclusive, resolved an important question "completely separate" from the merits,
and was effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment in the underlying case because the manufacturer would irretrievably lose its statutory right not
to stand trial).
159 Id. at 1112.
160 Id. at 1111 (quoting GARA § 2(a)(1)(A)).
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vides explicitly that "aircraft has the meaning given such term in
section 40102(a) (6) of Title 49, United States Code . . ." That

provision defines "aircraft" as "any contrivance invented, used,
or designed to navigate, or fly in, the air." 49 U.S.C.
§ 40102(a) (6).161 Further, the Ninth Circuit explained that an
aircraft cannot fulfill GARA's definition of general aviation aircraft at the time of delivery because one requirement of the definition is that it "was not, at the time of the accident, engaged in
scheduled passenger-carrying operations."162 Instead, the GARA
definition can only be satisfied once the accident has occurred
and the other requirements are met.
One of the fundamental principles of GARA is that when an
aircraft operates without incident for 18 years, its proven record
suggests that there is no product defect. Congress wanted to
shield manufacturers from costly litigation when the aircraft had
a lengthy track record of safety. The Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Kennedy helps further this public policy goal.
B.

TRIGGER OF "ROLLING" STATUTE OF REPOSE FOR
REPLACEMENT PARTS

GARA provides for a "rolling" statute of repose with regard to
replacement parts. When a new part is added to the aircraft, or
replaces an old part, the statute of repose starts all over again
with regard to that part.163 As one court said, "[s]ince almost
every major component of the aircraft will be replaced over its
lifetime, the 'rolling' aspect of the statute of repose was intended to provide that victims and their families would have recourse against the manufacturer of the new component part in
the event of a defect in the new part causing an accident."1 "4
If the additional or replacement part is a used part, though,
the statute of limitations with regard to that used part should
continue to run. Rep. Glickman, one of GARA's original sponsors, explained during the House debate that "a used propeller
which has 3 years left on its applicable limitation period would
161 Id.

(quoting GARA

§ 3(1)).

162 Id.

16-3See Flores v. Ram Aircraft Corp., No. 96-1507-CIV (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2000)
(denying summary judgment on GARA grounds where defendant failed to address plaintiffs claims that a defective component part that contributed to the
accident was added to the engine during an overhaul within the repose period,
even though defendant had uncontroverted evidence the engine itself was deliver more than 18 years before case was filed).
164
Burroughs, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 131-32.
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still have only 3 years, if installed in its used condition on a different airplane."16' 5 In Butler, the court refused to re-start the
repose period where the used part that allegedly caused the accident was added to the plane one year before the accident. 6 6
The part's retirement life had been extended and the part was
reinstalled. The court stated that this "cannot be considered the
installation of a new part because it is the precise opposite of
that." 167
When the rolling statute of repose provision is triggered, suit
is authorized only against the manufacturer of the replacement
part, not against the manufacturers of the airframe or other
components. 168 In Campbell v. Parker-HannifinCorp., 169 the plaintiffs argued that the replacement of component parts during the
repose period triggered a new time frame that was applicable
not only to the component part manufacturers but also to the
plane's manufacturer. 17 The court disagreed, relying on the
legislative history that provided: "Since the bill provides for a
'rolling' statute of repose, victims and their families will have
recourse against new component part manufacturers for a part installed subsequent to delivery in the event of a crash attributable
to a structural defect or similar flaw in a new component
part. ' 171 The Court's decision reflects both the letter of and
public policy behind GARA.
C.

EXCEPTIONS TO

GARA

GARA provides four exceptions to the statute of repose: the
fraud exception, the medical emergency exception, the not
aboard the aircraft exception, and the written warranty exception. The latter three exceptions are relatively straightforward.
165 140 CONG. REC. H4998-02 (1994).

166 Butler, No. BC 206780, at 9.
167Id.

See H. R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 2.
169Campbell v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 202 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002).
168

170See id. at 209.
171Id. (quoting H. R. REP. No. 103-525,pt.2 (emphasis in original)).

See also
Davenport v. Precision Airmotive, No. SC-041-139, at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. Cty.
Feb. 21, 1997) (granting summaryjudgment despite plaintiffs argument that defendant Textron-Lycoming could not assert GARA because it did not manufacture the allegedly defective components at issue, and stating that "no reason is
advanced why Textron-Lycoming should remain in the case .... There is nothing . . .to indicate that these [allegedly defective] components were manufactured by Textron-Lycoming.").
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Medical Emergency Exception

The medical emergency exception is designed to provide additional protection to certain people who had no choice about
being on the aircraft, such as accident victims being airlifted to a
hospital for emergency treatment. While the statutory language
says "medical or other emergency," GARA's legislative history
makes clear that its purpose was to protect medical emergency
patients. Still, given the plain language of the statute, it is likely
that a person having been rescued from a flood or similar emergency could invoke the exception.
Pilots, flight engineers, and flight navigators are considered
"flight crew" and thus cannot invoke the medical emergency exception. 7 2 Some commentators have argued that paramedics
on a MedEvac aircraft should be able to invoke the exception
along with the patients. '7 The public policy behind the law suggests that this exception is limited to those who are aboard the
helicopter for receiving treatment, not those who are aboard for
providing treatment, since the provision is intended to apply to
people who did not freely choose to fly aboard the aircraft. A
California trial court understood this public policy when it applied GARA in a case that arose out of a crash of a Los Angeles
Fire Department helicopter carrying an accident victim. 174 The

court explicitly noted that GARA's medical emergency exception applied to the claims of the accident victim, but granted
summary judgment to the defendant with regard to claims by
75
the paramedics as well as the flight crew.
2.

"Not on the Plane"Exception

Like the "medical emergency" exception, the "not on the
plane" exception is intended to exempt people who did not
choose to board the aircraft. Recall that a key aspect for passage
of the bill was support by owners and operators of private
planes. Under this exception, if a defective aircraft crashes into
another and injures passengers on the second aircraft, or if it
crashes and injures people on the ground, those persons not on
the defective plane are exempt from the statute of repose.
171

See 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1998).

173 See Hedrick, supra note 110, at 405-12; Anton, supra note 11, at 794.
17"
175

Butter, No. BC 206780, at 2.
I.

20021 THE GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT
3.

1301

Warranty Exception

The warranty exception is intended to recognize those situations where the manufacturer and the buyer negotiate a longer
safety warranty than the 18-year statute of repose. The legislative history of GARA states that "in the event a manufacturer
desires to specifically warrant the safety of its product for a period of time beyond the applicable statute of repose, the courts
would honour the manufacturer's written warranty."' 1 76 The few
plaintiffs who have raised this exception have generally been unsuccessful because they failed to show that a specific warranty
1 77
existed.
4.

Fraud Exception

The fraud exception has been the most litigated. A key justification for the federal government's involvement with GARA and
its protections is its "cradle to grave" oversight of the aviation
industry.'7 8 The aviation industry is heavily regulated by the federal government through the FAA certification process. In light
of this comprehensive regulation, open-ended civil liability exposure for general aviation manufacturers was seen as a redundant and heavy-handed use of the judicial system as a deterrent
to the manufacture of unsafe airplanes. 179 As two commentators
have noted:
[t]he FAA's comprehensive requirements of airworthiness and
type certification of each aircraft were determined by Congress
to provide sufficient safeguards, particularly with 18 years of exposure to private, civil liability. Thus, the underlying premise of
the fraud exception is that the protections afforded by GARA are
not to be taken away from a manufacturer unless it can be clearly
shown to have abused the FAA's airworthiness and type certification process.'8

H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 2, at 5-7.
See, e.g., Schneider, No. 542343, at 3 (finding that the plaintiff failed to carry
its burden of proving a written warranty existed); Davenport, No. SC-041-139, at 3
(finding that the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of a written warranty);
Alter, 944 F. Supp. at 538 (stating that the plaintiff alleged an express or implied
breach of warranty but dismissing the case on GARA grounds).
178 Oliver &Jones, supra note 50, at 246.
171H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt 2, at 5-7.
180 Oliver & Jones, supra note 50, at 253.
176
17
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Substance of the Fraud Exception

The procedural requirements for the issuance of type certificates and airworthiness certificates are set forth in Part 21 of
FAR. Manufacturers who hold type certificates have a continuing duty to report to the FAA all part failures, malfunctions and
defects they determine have resulted or may result in certain
occurrences listed in the FAR. 8 ' This information must be reported in order to obtain continuing airworthiness. 1 2 This reporting requirement is intended to allow the FAA to ensure that
aircraft problems are satisfactorily resolved.
To trigger the fraud exception, the manufacturer must have
"knowingly" misrepresented, withheld, or concealed a certain
type of information. 8 3 Not all information relating to the aircraft will implicate the fraud exception. Instead, the fraud exception may be triggered only where the information at issue is:
"required information that is material and relevant to the performance or the maintenance or operation of such aircraft, or
the component, system, subassembly, or other part, that is causally related to the harm which the claimant allegedly
suffered." '
b.

What is the Appropriate Standard of Intent?

GARA states that the fraud exception applies where the manufacturer has "knowingly misrepresented to the Federal Aviation
Administration, or concealed or withheld from the Federal Aviation Administration, required information.""'
Plaintiffs are required to establish the requisite level of the
manufacturer's intent in order to invoke this exception. Some
have sought to make an issue of whether the word "knowingly"
in the exception modifies "concealed" and "withheld" as well as
"misrepresented." One commentator has suggested otherwise,
stating that "[i]t is important to note that knowingly only precedes and, thus, only applies to misrepresentation, and not to
the concealment or withholding of information."' 6 The commentator then argues that proof of the mere negligent withhold'-] 14 C.F.R. § 21.3(a) (listing types of occurrences).
182 Id. at § 21.1.
183

GARA, § 2(b)(1).

184

hi.

185

Id

18

See Hedrick, supra note 110, at 409.
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ing or concealment of information should be enough to trigger
the fraud exception.18 7
The language chosen by the drafters and the legislative purpose of GARA strongly suggests that proof of scienter is required
as to all three types of fraudulent acts.188 Unlike the verb "to
misrepresent," the verbs "to conceal" and "to withhold" both require the actor to be acting at least with knowledge, if not with
intent. In including this exception, Congress sought to address
three different situations where a manufacturer could fraudulently make use of the repose period by ensuring the FAA has
misinformation about a particular problem: first, by affirmatively misrepresenting the information; second, by withholding
the information, thereby providing misinformation by omission;
and finally, by concealing the information to knowingly provide
misinformation by omission where the information has been affirmatively requested. This has been the approach of courts addressing this exception.1 8
c.

What Acts Constitute Fraud?

Courts considering the fraud exception have generally "gotten it right" and interpreted the exception in line with its legislative purpose. Under these cases, the fraud exception is
triggered only where the particular defendant knowingly misrepresented or failed to report information required by statute
or requested by the FAA about the aircraft or the component
part at issue, and where the alleged misrepresentation or failure
to report information was both material and causally related to
the accident.
Courts have refused to apply the fraud exception where a defendant was not legally required to provide the FAA with the
information at issue. This sensible approach is consistent with
the statutory language. For example, in Cartman v. Textron
187 Hedrick, supra note 110, at 409. "That is an argument we have faced.... I
can report to you that in Michigan, those judges who have faced that argument
or similar arguments have found it not to be very persuasive, but that is an indication of the kinds of things that the courts are being asked to look at in order to
avoid the application of GARA." Humphrey, supra note 4, at 176.
188 Statutes are to be interpreted to give effect to congressional intent. See Norfolk Redevelopment & Housing Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 464
U.S. 30 (1983).
189 See, e.g., Rickert v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1453, 1456 (D.
Wyo. 1996) (applying the knowledge requirement to all three prongs of the
fraud exception) [hereinafter "Rickert I"].
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Lycoming ReciprocatingEngine Division,'9" the federal district court
was "unwilling to infer a duty under [the fraud exception] requiring defendants to volunteer information which is (1) not
required by statute or regulation, (2) not in response to a direct
inquiry by the FAA, or (3) not necessary in order to correct information previously supplied directly by the defendant to the
FAA." 191 In this case, the pilot of a small plane sued for injuries
sustained in a crash allegedly caused by the installation of a
faulty composite carburetor float manufactured by Rogers Corporation. The plaintiff alleged that anotherdefendant had made
misrepresentations to the FAA about design and manufacturing
defects in the float. The plaintiff did not explicitly assert that
Rogers Corporation knew about the alleged misrepresentations,
but did suggest that Rogers was aware of the alleged defects.
The court granted Roger Corporation's motion for summary
judgment, refusing to apply the fraud exception "merely because a defendant has not informed the FAA about either possible safety concerns regarding1' 92 a part or possible
misrepresentations by other parties."
Similarly, in Butler, a state court properly refused to apply the
fraud exception where a manufacturer had not reported accidents regarding the corresponding military version of the aircraft at issue.' 93" The court explained that there was no evidence
that the manufacturer was required to do so.' 94 The plaintiffs
principally argued that by failing to report such accidents, the
manufacturer violated an FAA regulation requiring manufacturers who hold type certificates to report "any failure" in an aircraft.' 95 The court disagreed. It found that manufacturers of
military aircraft are not required to obtain type certificates and
that therefore the regulation did not establish mandatory reporting requirements for military aircraft.196 The court found
190 Cartman v. Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division, No. 94-CV72582-DT, 1996 WL 316575 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27 1996).
-1 Id. at *3.
192 Id.

193 Butler, No. BC 206780, at 7-8.
194 Id.
95 In 1989 and 1996, the years relevant to the case, FAR § 21.3 stated that "(a)
the holder of a Type Certificate .. , including a Parts Manufacturer Approval

(PMA) .... shall report any failure, malfunction, or defect in any product, part,
process, or article manufactured by it that it determines has resulted in any of the
occurrences listed in paragraph (c) if this section."
196 Butler, No. BC 206780, at 7-8. An affidavit submitted by Bell stated that
military aircraft are typically "purpose-built" to military procurement specifica-
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that plaintiffs had introduced no evidence showing that manufacturers of military aircraft actually reported such failures to
the FAA under that regulation.'9 7 The court said:
Plaintiffs' argument that the literal or plain meaning of 2.13 covers "any failure" is not persuasive against the apparent actual
practice of the FAA and the manufacturers. An agency's rules
and regulations must be read in the context of the agency's jurisdiction. The "plain meaning" guideline should not be followed
so as to interpret a rule as having expanded the scope of the
issuing agency's jurisdiction."8
In Campbell v. Parker-Hannifan Corp., 9 the court correctly
ruled that the fraud exception did not apply where the manufacturer did not report problems with the component part that
caused the accident where the problems had arisen in regard to
a different model plane. Campbell arose out of a crash that occurred after the failure of vacuum pumps in the aircraft's flight
instruments. Plaintiffs challenged the court's grant of summary
judgment under GARA to Cessna, the plane's manufacturer.
The plaintiffs claimed that Cessna had concealed knowledge
about safety issues with the vacuum pumps, citing a National
Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB") report based on information from the FAA that discussed vacuum pump accidents in a
different model of Cessna plane, the 210N, and recommended
that the FAA conduct further studies and issue directives about
the vacuum pumps in the Cessna 210N model aircraft. The
court noted that while the report noted concern by the FAA and
NTSB about the failure rate of the vacuum pumps, this concern
related to the failure rate in the 210N model plane, not the 310
model involved in the crash.2 '' The court observed that the detailed review by the NTSB and the recommendations made to

the FAA for further study "tend to defeat, not support, claims of
misrepresentation and concealment by Cessna" and that plaintions and that while military and civilian aircraft may share common parts, these
aircraft are designed to different load spectrums, which can result in different
operating limitations and component service lives. See id. at 6-7.
197

Id. at 8.

198Id.
199Campbell v. Parker-Hannifan Corp., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 202 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999).
200 Id. at 208. The Butler court similarly ruled that a manufacturer's failure to
report problems with a part in the corresponding military version of a helicopter
was irrelevant. Butler, No. BC 206780, at 8 ("Nondisclosure of the military failures
was irrelevant.").
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tiffs failed to raise "any reasonable inference of knowing
misrep2
resentation or concealment on the part of Cessna.

11

Pleading the Fraud Exception

d.

Congress required plaintiffs seeking to invoke the fraud exemption to plead with "specificity" the facts supporting the
fraud claim. Only a handful of courts have elaborated on the
contours of this pleading standard, but it is an "obvious analog"
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires parties
to plead fraud with particularity. ''21 2 "This requirement is im-

portant because it immediately puts the burden on the claimant
to affirmatively set forth the facts supporting each allegation. 2 °3
This heightened pleading standard is intended to prevent
plaintiffs from pleading general claims about very old aircraft
that either are not supported by facts or are frivolous.2 °4 Without this key requirement, plaintiffs counsel could make general
allegations of fraud and maintain a lawsuit long enough to embroil the defendant in expensive and burdensome discovery
with the goal of forcing a settlement.2

5

11

As two commentators

explained, " [W] ithout this initial gatekeeping device, GARA is at
designed to guard
risk of being ineffective, since it is specifically
' 2 °6
against this very kind of litigation tactic.
Other commentators, though, have argued that this strict
pleading requirement raises a procedural problem: claimants
may not have access to information that the manufacturer has
and thus cannot satisfy the requirement. 20 7 As a result, claimants may need to perform limited discovery in order to determine whether such facts exist.211 Courts generally have been
willing to allow plaintiffs to conduct limited discovery or file an
amended complaint to address problems with defective pleadCampbell, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 210.
Rickert I, 923 F. Supp. at 1456 .
203 Hedrick, supra note 110, at 405-06.
204 See Hedrick, supra note 110, at 406.
205 Humphrey, supra note 4, at 175-76.
206 Oliver & Jones, supra note 50, at 253.
207 See Hedrick, supra note 110, at 406.
208 Charles Hvass, former chairman of ATLA's aviation section, said defendants
would still face aggressive discovery: "We are going to be in the files of the FAA
and filing pretrial discovery requests - or actually presuit discovery requests
under . . . Federal Rule 29, which allows you to go forward and get discovery
before trial." Charles T. Hvass, Esq., Remarks, General Aviation Revitalization Act
Panel Discussion, 63J. AIR L. & COM. 169, 181 (1997).
201

202
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ings .20 At least one defendant has argued that these procedural
"helps" for plaintiff's counsel are unnecessary because ethical
provisions require attorneys to be knowledgeable about evidentiary support for allegations or factual contentions in their
papers.2 1 °
In Rickert v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd., the plaintiff argued that the manufacturer fraudulently concealed information
about problems with the plane that led to the crash. 2 11 The federal district court held that "GARA requires more than innuendo and inference; it demands 'specificity.' ' 2 12 The court
identified the elements requiring specificity in pleading as: "(1)
knowledge; (2) misrepresentation, concealment, or withholding
of required information to the FAA; (3) materiality and relevance; and (4) a causal relationship between the harm and the
accident. 21 3 The Rickert court granted the defendant's motion
to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiffs' evidence was merely
"differences of opinion concerning design issues" that were
2 14
"dress[ed] up" as "misrepresentations and concealments.
In Wright v. Bond-Air, Ltd., the state trial court rejected the
defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff ade200 See Order at 2, Hinkle v. Riley Aviation, Case No. 96-03161 NP (Mich. Cir.
Ct. Branch Cty. Mar. 21, 1999) (provisionally dismissing defendants on GARA
grounds but giving plaintiff leave to conduct discovery on whether specified exceptions to GARA might apply); Rickert I, 923 F. Supp. at 1453 (allowing plaintiff
30 additional days of discovery to explore facts supporting fraud exception where
defendant allegedly "stonewalled" discovery efforts).
210 Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 17, Carr v. United Technologies
Corp. (Cal. Super., Ct. Ventura Cty. Aug. 30, 1996) (No. CIV 152495) ("Code of
Civil Procedure § 128.7 requires an attorney, when signing a pleading to be filed
with the court (such as a complaint), to certify that he has conducted a reasonable inquiry into the allegations and factual contentions in the pleading and certifies that they have evidentiary support.")
21, Rickert I, 923 F. Supp. at 1453.
212 Id. at 1462.
213Id. at 1456.
214 Id. at 1460 and 1462. The court, however, allowed an additional 30 days of
discovery on the fraud issue. See Rickert v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., 929 F.
Supp. 380, 385 app. (D. Wyo. 1996) (entry of order staying summaryjudgment in
order to provide for limited discovery and supplemental briefing on summary
judgment motion). The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to reconsider and
submitted additional evidence in support of her fraud claim. The evidence consisted of two affidavits, both of which stated that the defendant knew of relevant
safety problems and knowingly withheld the information from the FAA. The
court found this testimony sufficient to "create a genuine issue of material fact
concerning a knowing misrepresentation" to defeat a summaryjudgment motion
based on GARA. Id. at 382.
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quately pled her state law cause of action despite GARA's heightened pleading standard. 2 15 The court explained:
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs complaint failed to plead knowledge and misrepresentation with the requisite specificity, but
merely pleads conclusions. A review of the complaint reveals
that Plaintiff has pled both knowledge and misrepresentation
with the requisite specificity, see paragraphs 17(b), (e), (f) and
(g). Plaintiff alleges, for example, in [17] (f) and (g) that Cessna
submitted to the FAA a series of reports which it knew at the time
the reports were submitted did not accurately and adequately reflect the flight handling qualities and characteristics, maintenance requirements and vacuum air delivery system . . . Cessna
knew that it had made material misrepresentations to the
FAA... Plaintiff has adequately alleged the elements required by
2 16
Rickert.
VII.

GARA BARS CLAIMS FOR POST-SALE
FAILURE TO WARN
A.

POST-SALE DUTY TO WARN

Plaintiffs have sought to avoid application of the statute of repose by arguing that post-sale failure to warn claims should not
be barred by GARA. They argue that a manufacturer has a continuing post-sale duty to warn of alleged hazards involving the
plane, a duty that continues up until the time of an accident.
Courts have generally rejected this approach. 2 17 They have
noted that allowing such claims to proceed would eviscerate the
protections afforded by GARA, since practically every claim
could be recharacterized as a breach of the post-sale duty to
warn. Accordingly, courts have rejected plaintiffs' efforts to
evade GARA with post-sale failure to warn claims. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit took this approach
21.Wright v. Bond-Air, Ltd., No. 96-71886 (E.D. Mich. July 17, 1996) (on file
with author).
216

Id. at 15.

See, e.g., Campbell, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 202. In this case, plaintiffs argued that
Cessna knew or should have known of safety problems with replacement vacuum
pumps manufactured by another company, which allegedly caused a plan to
crash. Plaintiffs claimed that "Cessna knew or should have known that the parts
would not work and failed to issue any warning to aircraft owners or to the FAA."
Id. at 209. The court rejected this argument, stating that "the GARA limitation
period may not be circumvented simply by labeling the claim as one for failure to
warn. Appellants are still attempting to hold Cessna liable for actions connected
with its role as manufacturer." Id. at 210.
217
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in Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A.,2 18 when it rejected the plaintiffs' postsale failure to warn claim. The Ninth Circuit stated that if the
alleged failure to warn re-started the 18-year repose period,
"GARA would have little value to manufacturers because the
plaintiff could always argue that an 18-year period commenced
if the manufacturer did nothing at all, while simultaneously arguing that if the manufacturer did do something
that, too,
2 19
running.
period
18-year
new
a
would start
A California state appeals court also ruled that the plaintiffs
could not proceed on a theory of breach of the independent
duty to warn. In Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp.,2 t ° the
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the defendant, a
general aviation aircraft parts manufacturer whose predecessor
had purchased the product line from the original manufacturer,
was liable for failure to warn. The plaintiffs had argued that the
successor had established an ongoing relationship with the purchasers of the carburetor, from which it derived an economic
benefit. Plaintiffs said the successor knew about defects in the
carburetor and therefore had a duty to warn those customers of
the defects. The court refused to accept this argument, explaining that California had not adopted this theory of liability, and
the court did not wish to do so in the circumstances of this case:
Precision's duties and obligations concerning this product, including a continuing duty to warn, were imposed on it by federal
law. Imposing a separate and independent duty based on general principles of tort law would not only be superfluous in light
of the federal statutory scheme regulating and overseeing the duties of manufacturers in the general aviation industry, but would
also directly conflict with that statutory scheme.2 2 '
A federal district court in the Ninth Circuit reached a different conclusion. In Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.,22 2 the
Lyon, 252 F.3d at 1078 .
Id. at 1088; see also Reynolds, Findings of Fact, at 8 (stating that "[t]o accept
plaintiffs' argument that a new cause of action arises every time there is an overhaul at which the accused part arguably might have been replaced would render
a statute of repose largely meaningless" and where the accused part itself is protected by the statute of repose, the statute of repose cannot be circumvented by
recouching the claim as a 'failure to warn' claim or, as plaintiffs do here, a claim
that the allegedly defective part should have been replaced together with other
parts (which is simply a failure to warn claim under another guise.)).
220 Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 124 (Cal. Ct. App.
218

219

2000).
221
222

Burroughs, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 136.
Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., No. C98-5579RJB, at 8-9.
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United States District Court for the Western District of Washington ruled that Washington state law "clearly provides that a manufacturer may be subject to liability for the failure to warn of
design defects in its products" and therefore that Bell had a
post-sale duty to warn of design defects.22 The court ruled that
it was for the jury to determine whether Bell breached that duty
as well as whether the helicopter had a design defect that proximately caused the accident and plaintiffs' damages.224 The Kennedy court's ruling was unwise, as this approach undermines the
legislative purpose of GARA.
B.

CLAIMS BASED ON AIRCRAFr MANUALS

Plaintiffs have focused on various flight and service manuals
in attempts to get around GARA. Most of the cases are a variant
on attempts to claim breach of a post-sale duty to warn. Courts
have recognized these as attempts to circumvent the statute of
repose by providing a "back door" to sue for the design flaw ostensibly not for the design flaw itself, but for the failure of the
manuals to adequately correct the flaw.
Under this approach, plaintiffs argue that revisions to flight
or maintenance manuals trigger the rolling limitations period
for claims involving new parts.225 This argument is patterned
after a pre-GARA state court case, Driver v. Burlington Aviation
Inc.,2 26 in which a court accepted the view that an instruction
manual rather than the aircraft was the defective product at issue. 227 In Driver,the plaintiffs alleged that incorrect information
in the manual about carburetor icing and slow-flight characteristics led to the crash of an airplane. Plaintiffs argued the North
Carolina statute of repose did not apply to their claims based on
the information manual, because the information manual was
sold separately. The North Carolina court said that if the information manual were sold within the repose period, the claim
would not be precluded. That is because the manual, and not the
aircraft, was the defective product that created the plaintiffs'
228
cause of action.
I d. at 8 (citing RCW § 7.72.030(1) (c)).
id. at 9.
225 GARA, § 2(a)(2). See, e.g., Alter, 944 F. Supp. at 531; Buernan v. Raytheon
Aircraft Co., No. CV197-4742 CL (Mo. Cir. Ct., St. Charles Cty. Jan. 17, 2000)
(claims based on re-issuance of aircraft manual are barred by GARA).
226 Driver v. Burlington Aviation Inc., 430 S.E.2d 476 (N.C. App. 1993).
227 See Anton, supra note 11, at 803.
228 Driver, 430 S.E.2d at 483.
"

224
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Federal courts have rejected this approach.2 29 In one of the
first cases to interpret GARA, Alter v. Bell Helicopter Textron,
Inc.,23 ° the defendants argued that the plaintiffs had fraudulently joined one defendant, Bell Helicopter, in order to defeat
removal. The defendants said that as a matter of law, GARA prevented any possibility of recovery by the plaintiffs against Bell,
and therefore that Bell's presence in the lawsuit did not defeat
removal. The plaintiff argued that GARA did not apply because
the aircraft accident was proximately caused by misleading instructions in a maintenance manual. It was alleged that the
manual failed to warn of the propensity of an aircraft part to fail
prematurely and to prescribe proper inspection procedures to
detect this design flaw. The plaintiff took the position that a
manual revision is a "new component, system, subassembly, or
other part which replaced another component, system, subassembly, or other part originally in, or which was added to, the
aircraft" under Section 2(a) (2) of GARA. There was no evidence as to when the allegedly misleading instructions first appeared.23' Instead, the plaintiff argued that since the manual as
a whole was revised twice a year, the statute of repose was restarted after each such revision.2 3 2 The plaintiff said, "By refusing to apply the statute of repose under these circumstances,
courts will ensure that defendants don't take lightly their obligation to incorporate new information as the manuals are

republished. "233
The Alter court rejected this argument. The court relied on a
number of non-GARA statute of repose cases holding that manufacturers' maintenance and repair manuals are not a "separate" product or component upon which plaintiffs may base a
claim to avoid a repose statute. 2 4 Rather than constituting a
229 See, e.g., Butler, No. BC 206780, at 9 (after increasing part's retirement life
from 4,000 hours to 5,000 hours, "the resultant change in the maintenance manual for the helicopter cannot be viewed as the installation of a new part in the
helicopter. The inspection tool and the maintenance manual are not parts of the
aircraft. The court cannot turn the meaning of words on their head in order to
preserve plaintiffs' claims against the Bell parties.").
230 Alter, 944 F. Supp. at 531.
231 See id. at 537.
232 See id. at 538.
233 Id. at 537.
234 See, e.g., Alexander v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 952 F.2d 1215 (10th Cir. 1991).
In Alexander, a non-GARA case, a plane crashed after running out of fuel. The
plaintiffs argued that the operator handbook issued by the defendant manufacturer was defective because it overstated the amount of usable fuel in the aircraft.
The defendant manufacturer argued that the handbook was a "replacement
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"replacement part," the court said, the manual simply would be
"part of the evidence proffered by plaintiffs which bears on a
failure to warn theory" against the defendant. 2 5 The Alter court
said that these cases showed that a manufacturer's provision of
maintenance and repair manuals was part of its duty to warn as a
manufacturer, not a separate and discrete post-sale undertaking
creating a separate cause of action.236 Otherwise,
[t] he result would be the evisceration of the statute of repose.
If a plaintiff is precluded by the statute of repose from suing for
a design flaw in a product, the plaintiff must also be precluded
from suing for a failure to correct the design flaw, whether that
failure be in the inadequacy of the text of a subsequently issued
owner's manual or in repair guidelines subsequently sent to
mechanics.237

The Alter court rejected the failure to warn claims based on
the allegedly misleading inspection manual. It ruled that GARA
barred the plaintiffs' manufacturing defect claims.23 8 In another case arising out of the same incident, the court followed
the lead in Alter and granted the defense motion for summary
part" under the statute of repose which, like the similar GARA provisions, triggered a new repose period. The Tenth Circuit held that an operator handbook
was not a "replacement part," but merely "part of the evidence proffered by plaintiffs which bears on a failure to warn theory" against the defendant. Id. at 1220.
Other state statute of repose cases cited in Alter include Schamel v. TextronLycoming, 1F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 1993) (Indiana statute of repose bars action
for failure to warn of alleged latent product defect; issuance of service manuals
and other sources of service information was not a separate and discrete post-sale
undertaking because such information is "generally necessary to satisfy the manufacturer's duty to warn"); Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1135
(6th Cir. .1986) (Tennessee statute of repose bars claim for failure to warn; instruction manual cannot be considered a separate "product" issued within the
limitation period); Butchkosky v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp., 855 F. Supp. 1251, 1257
(S.D. Fla. 1993) (Florida statute of repose bars claims for helicopter repairs despite plaintiffs argument that because repairs were done according to the manufacturers' instruction manual, and the manual was issued within the repose
period, the claim was still viable).
2
Alter, 944 F. Supp. at 538 (citing Alexander, 952 F.2d at 1220).
2 13 Alter, 944 F. Supp. at 540-41 & n.5.
237 Id. at 539 (quoting Butchkosky, 855 F. Supp. at 1255) (emphasis added by
Alter court).
238 Id. at 541. The court similarly rejected plaintiff's breach of warranty claim.
The court noted that under Texas law, a plaintiff can predicate a products liability action on a breach of warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code. However, the court said, an operating manual does not constitute "goods" within the
meaning of the U.C.C. Therefore, GARA precludes a state law claim for breach
of warranty because Bell's maintenance manual is not a good, but rather part of
its duty to warn. Id. at 539 n.4.
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judgment on GARA grounds. 23 9 Pro-plaintiff commentators
have criticized Alter as presenting a catch-22 situation from a policy standpoint:
On the one hand, as long as manufacturers are protected under
GARA with regard to updating their aircraft manuals, they have a
complete incentive to do so without the concern of additional
liability exposure. Yet, on the other hand, it is difficult to distinguish between the triggering of a new statute of repose for a new
part that is required by the manufacturer to be replaced for
safety reasons, and no new triggering date when the manufacturer changes or revises
its maintenance manual to make the air24
craft safer for flight.
In Alter, the court noted that the plaintiffs claimed both the
existence of a design defect and, essentially, failure to warn of
that defect. The court stated that plaintiffs' theory "is that a specific component failed because of defective design - a propensity to prematurely fatigue and fail - and test, and that the
manual described an inspection procedure which did not correct the design flaw or allow it to be detected ... [T] he suit for
failure of the manuals to correct a design flaw is precluded by
the statute of repose that bars a suit for the design flaw. "241
In Caldwell v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp.,24 2 plaintiffs filed suit
against a helicopter manufacturer after a crash. The pilot had
planned the trip not knowing that the last two gallons of gasoline in the helicopter's fuel tanks could not be used. The helicopter was within 10 minutes of its destination when the usable
fuel ran out and the plane crashed. Plaintiffs did not argue that
the fuel tanks were defective - they "conceded that the fuel
tanks themselves were in good working order. ' 24 3 Instead, plaintiffs alleged the helicopter's flight manual was defective because
it did not include an FAA-required warning that the last two gallons of gasoline in the fuel tank would not burn. 24 4 They argued
2
39 See Shen Li v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., No. 4:96-CV-116-E (June 7,
1996) (granting defense motion for summary judgment on GARA ground);
Schneider, No. 542343, at 3 (granting defense motion for summary judgment on
ground that plaintiffs failure to warn claims based on alleged shortcomings in
service manuals, saying that allowing these claims "would circumvent GARA providing a back door to sue for a design flaw.").
240 See Hedrick, supra note 110, at 396.
241 Alter, 944 F. Supp. at 540.
242 Caldwell v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp., 230 F.3d at 1115, 1157 (9th Cir.

2000).
243

See id. at 1156.

2,14

See id. at 1156-57.
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that while the helicopter was 23 years old, their claim fell within
GARA's "rolling" feature, because the flight manual had been
revised several times in the past 18 years and thus was a new
"system... or other part" of the helicopter within the meaning
of the rolling provision. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's ruling that a revised manual, as a matter of law, can never
fall within GARA's rolling provision.
Instead, the Ninth Circuit ruled, an aircraft flight manual is a
"part of the aircraft"24 and, under certain circumstances, can
fall within GARA's rolling provision. Unlike other manufacturer
publications, flight manuals are required by the FAA to accompany each aircraft and must contain "information that is necessary for safe operation because of design, operating, or handling
characteristics." '4 6 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit explained, the
missing warning that was allegedly the cause of the accident at
issue was required by the FAA to be included in the flight manual. "The
manual specifically must include information about a gas tank's
unusable fuel supply, if the unusable portion exceeds one gallon
or five percent of the tank capacity. ' 247 The court concluded
that, in light of those federal requirements, "There is no room
to assert that a helicopter manufacturer's [flight] manual is a
2 48

separate product.

Even though a flight manual may be considered a part of the
aircraft, the Caldwell court ruled that a revision of the flight
manual does not circumvent the rolling GARA provision unless
the change itself caused the injury. The court explained this ruling:
Just as the installation of a new rotor blade does not start the 18year period of repose anew for purposes of an action for damages due to a faulty fuel system, a revision to any part of the manual except that which describes the fuel system would be

irrelevant here. Furthermore, mere cosmetic changes (like
changing the manual's typeface) do not revive the statute of
repose.

Id. at 1157.
See id. (citing 14 C.F.R. 27.1581 (a) (2)).
,17 Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. 27.1585(e)).
2-18 Id. The court further explained: "[A] flight manual is an integral part of the
general aviation aircraft product that a manufacturer sells. It is not a separate,
general instructional guide (like a book on how to ski), but instead is detailed
and particular to the aircraft to which it pertains. The manual is the "part" of the
aircraft that contains the instructions that are necessary to operate the aircraft
and is not separate from it." Id.
!!,15

2-11;
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In sum, if Defendant substantively altered, or deleted, a warning
about the fuel system from the manual within the last 18 years,
and it is alleged that the revision or omission is the proximate
cause of the accident, then GARA does not bar the action.2 49
Moreover, it is important to note that under Caldwell, the
manufacturer's failure to add the relevant warning to the manual during the revision process was not enough to restart the
statute of repose. Indeed, that would be tantamount to allowing
GARA to be avoided by an alleged breach of a continuing duty
to warn. Instead, plaintiffs were required to prove both that the
manufacturer substantively altered or deleted an existing warning about the alleged problem during the repose period, and
25
that the revision or omission proximately caused the accident.
Subsequently, in Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A.,2 5 ' the Ninth Circuit
emphasized the limits of its holding in Caldwell. In Lyon, the
plaintiffs argued that the 18-year repose period was re-started
once the manufacturer discovered a problem with the aircraft,
which subsequently caused the accident. 2 52 Plaintiffs said that
the manufacturer's failure to warn about the newly perceived
problem amounted "to something like replacement of a component part" because it breached an alleged continuing duty to
upgrade and warn. 25 3' The Ninth Circuit disagreed, saying:
"Were that so, GARA would have little value to manufacturers
because the plaintiff could always argue that an 18-year period
commenced if the manufacturer did nothing at all, while simultaneously arguing that if the manufacturer did do something
that, too, would start a new 18-year period running. That is not
the law."' 25 4 The Ninth Circuit reemphasized the distinction it
drew between the revision or deletion of a relevant warning already in a flight manual, and post-sale failure to warn. 25 5 "What
we alluded to there, we reify here: a failure to warn is decidedly
not the same as replacing a component part with a new one,"
the Ninth Circuit said.6 "It does not allow the [plaintiffs] to by25
pass the GARA bar.

253

Id. at 1158 (emphasis added).
Id.
Lyon, 252 F.3d at 1078.
Id. at 1088.
Id.

254

Id. (citation omitted).

255

Id.

256

Id. (citation omnitted).

249
250
251
252
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Thus, Caldwell and Lyon establish a high standard for plaintiffs
to satisfy when seeking to avoid GARA with an argument based
on the revision of manuals during the repose period. First,
plaintiffs must establish that the manual at issue is required by
the FAA and thus is a "part" of the aircraft. Second, plaintiffs
must establish that the manufacturer "substantially altered or
deleted" an existing warning about the relevant problem with
the aircraft at some point during the repose period. Third,
plaintiffs must establish that the alteration or deletion of that
warning was the proximate cause of the accident. This high
standard is consistent with the language and legislative purpose
of GARA.
VIII.
A.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

DOES GARA

CREATE FEDERAL JURISDICTION?

To date, courts have uniformly held that GARA does not create a basis for federal court jurisdiction. In Wright v. Bond-Air,
Ltd.,25 7 defendants sought to remove the case to federal court,
arguing that GARA provided a sufficient federal interest for it to
do so. Defendants conceded that the plaintiffs case arose
under state law. But they also argued that although the complaint did not reference GARA, the plaintiff had "artfully
pleaded" facts supporting GARA's knowing misrepresentation
exception-thus creating a federal condition precedent to be
satisfied. 25" Defendants further contended that plaintiffs artful
pleading did not conceal the fact that their complaint presented
a federal question sufficient to confer federal jurisdiction. 59
The court disagreed, stating that under the well-pleaded complaint rule, jurisdiction is determined from the face of the complaint, not from a defense or allegations in the complaint that
anticipate a defense. 26 While the court acknowledged that two
exceptions to that rule exist, it said neither were met. First, it
said, defendants did not rely upon the "complete preemption"
exception, which provides for federal jurisdiction when the state
law upon which the complaint is based has been totally preempted by federal law.1"' Next, it said, defendants failed to establish that the plaintiffs state law cause of action presented a
27
25H
259
2(A
20i

Wright v. Bond-Air, Ltd., 930 F. Supp. 300 (S.D. Mich. 1996).
Id. at 302.
Id. at 302-03.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 302-03.
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substantial federal question that would support a finding that
the case arises under federal law.262
The court said that GARA did not create a federal cause of
action or preempt state substantive product liability law.2 63 Instead, the court said, "GARA creates a national statute of repose
and serves a gatekeeping function for Plaintiffs state law action.
GARA is narrowly drafted to preempt only state law statutes of
limitation or statutes of repose that would permit lawsuits beyond GARA's 18 year limitation period in circumstances where
its exceptions do not apply. ' 264 The mere fact that GARA re-

quires the consideration of FAA regulations did not raise a sufficiently substantial federal issue, since FAA regulations do not
preempt traditional state law claims for negligence and do not
provide for a private right of action for violations of FAA regulations. 2 " Thus, the court said, consideration of the federal issue
"is not sufficiently substantial to confer federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ''266
In Alter, the defendants argued that the federal court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case, which alleged state law
claims, because "GARA completely preempts state law." The
court decided the jurisdiction issue on another ground and declined to consider this issue.267 The Alter defendants also argued
thatjoinder of the defendant with the GARA defense was fraudulently done in order to defeat federal court jurisdiction. In
that case, the joinder of Bell Helicopter, a Texas-headquartered
defendant, ostensibly prevented removal under diversity jurisdiction from Texas state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). Defendants successfully argued, though, that GARA plainly barred
suit against Bell andjoinder of Bell was fraudulent. 268 The court
denied plaintiffs' motion to remand and instead dismissed the
claims 269
against the defendant manufacturers on the basis of
GARA.

263

Wright, 930 F. Supp. at 303.
Id. at 302.

264

Id.

262

Id. at 304.
Id. at 305.
267 Alter, 944 F. Supp. at 541.
268 See id.
269 Id.
265

266
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B.

BURDEN OF PROOF ISSUES

Once the defendant comes forward with evidence that the accused aircraft or part was more than 18 years old, the burden of
proof should shift to the plaintiff to come forward as to why the
case should not be dismissed under GARA. The plaintiff should
have to identify the part alleged to have caused the accident,
which is part of its burden of proving its case in chief under tort
law, and show evidence that it was installed as a new replacement part on aircraft less than 18 years before.
In Reynolds v. Textron Inc., a case arising out of the alleged
failure of cylinder hold-nuts on an aircraft, the court emphasized that plaintiffs had the burden of proving that the rolling
repose period was applicable in their case. 270 The court said this
was true for two reasons:
First, defendant ... met its initial burden of proving the absence
of genuine factual issues and its entitlement tojudgment. Thereafter, the burden shifted to plaintiffs as the non-moving party to
demonstrate a "genuine issue for trial." Second, GARA s
(2) (a) (2) places the burden on plaintiffs invoking the separate
limitation period for new replacement parts to adduce evidence
that a new replacement
part had been installed less than 18 years
27 1
before the accident.
The court then considered plaintiffs' evidence, including affidavits and engine log and repair records, and ruled that the
plaintiffs had submitted no credible evidence showing the installation of nuts made by the defendant on the engine. "The most
plaintiffs have shown is the possibility that cylinder hold-down
nuts might have been replaced with other nuts of unknown age
and origin, at some unknown time. Such evidence, even if assumed true, both does not meet plaintiffs burden of proof and
is too speculative to defeat summary judgment on a statute of

repose. "272
270 Reynolds, Findings of Fact, at 10.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 14; see also Barkley v. Textron Lycoming, Inc., Case No. 34031 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Stanislaus Cty., Sept. 18, 1996) (plaintiffs claim that the repose period
was re-triggered by installation of defendant-manufactured component parts during the 18-year repose period "is meaningless absent evidence that such parts
were manufactured fewer than 18 years before the accident [sic]"); accord Flores,
No. 96-1507-CIV (acknowledging plaintiff has burden of establishing the applicability of the rolling statute of repose, but denying defense motion for summary

judgment where defendant failed to rebut plaintiffs allegation that a defective
airplane component was added during an overhaul within the repose period).
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Some courts, however, have put the burden on defendants.
In Victoria v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., both parties agreed that
the aircraft was manufactured more than 18 years prior to the
crash. 27 3 The court said that in order to prevail on its motion
for summary judgment under GARA, the defendant was required
to prove that none of the component parts of the airplane contributing to the cause of the crash was less than 18 years old.
The court said, "Placing the burden of proof on defendant to
establish its right to rely on GARA is consistent with federal law,
under which prescription is an affirmative defense. Moreover,
the burden is more equitably placed on defendant, since it more
readily has the records that would establish whether parts manu274
factured by it might have been placed on the subject aircraft.
The court's reasoning was erroneous.
First, the Victoria court made a material mistake of fact when it
said its ruling was justified because the manufacturer has the
maintenance records for a plane. Instead, the FAA requires the
owner or operator to keep those records. As a result, the plaintiff, not the defendant, is more likely to have ready access to that
information. Second, the court improperly flipped the burden
of proof of causation onto the defendant - who in Victoria was
required to prove that the crash was not caused by any component part less than 18 years old - rather than the plaintiff. The
Victoria court miscited Altseimer as support for this ruling. The
Altseimer court granted summary judgment where the defendant
"provided undisputed evidence" that the aircraft and part in
275
question were more than 18 years old at the time of the crash.
The fact that the defendant provided "undisputed evidence" on
an issue does not mean the defendant is required to bear the
burden of proof on that issue. It simply means that the plaintiffs
failed to present competent evidence on that issue and raise a
material question of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
Similarly, in Glover v. American Resource Corp.,2 7 6 the court denied a summary judgment motion on GARA grounds brought
by General Electric, the manufacturer of the aircraft engine,
even though the two engines were more than 18 years old at the
time of the crash. The court ruled that "General Electric has
271 Victoria v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. 4:95-CV-723-A, at 2 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 16, 1997).
274 Id. at 3 (citations omitted).
275 Altseimer, 919 F. Supp. at 342.
276 Glover v. American Resource Corp., No. 160673 (Cal. Super. Ct., Marin
Cty., Sept. 13, 1996).
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not shown that it did not replace or add a part which was defective ...General Electric has this initial burden in order to show

that the period of repose in GARA bars this action. ' 277 The
court said that even though the plaintiffs did not raise the replacement part issue in their complaints, General Electric had
the burden on this issue because "the present statute specifically
addresses the issue of defective replacement parts. Thus, General Electric needed to show that the defective replacement provision did not apply in order to meet its burden of showing the
action is barred by the Act. '2 78 The court rejected defendants'

argument that it had no initial burden on the issue of new or
added parts because plaintiffs did not allege in their complaints
that parts replaced or added within the past 18 years caused the
crash. The court said:
This is not a case where plaintiffs are raising any new issue or
theory of liability. They have all alleged that the engines were
defectively designed, manufactured, etc. It is not a new issue or
theory to say that a replaced or added part might be defective, as
opposed to an original part, particularly since General Electric
itself states in its2 reply
brief that "component parts are constantly
79
being replaced.

The court said that General Electric admitted performing
what it termed ordinary and routine maintenance on the engines during the repose period, and that "[t]he fact that General Electric did not recondition or overhaul the engines and
performed only routine maintenance does not raise the reasonable inference that it did not replace any part which might have
caused the crash.

'280

We believe that the courts ruling is not

supported by the spirit and black letter of GARA. Defendant
showed his aircraft in question was over eighteen years old.
Once that showing is made, the plaintiff should be required to
show why the statute of repose was inapplicable.
C.

GARA

APPLIES TO ACTIONS OCCURRING IN
FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Plaintiffs have tried to evade GARA by arguing that it applies
only to domestic accidents. The only federal court to address
Id. at 10.
Id. at 6.
279
Id. at 7 (citation and footnote omitted). The court also noted that three
complaints alleged that General Electric "'modified' the aircraft, and four others
alleged that General Electric was negligent in 'other activit[ies]."' Id. at 7.
277

278

280

Id. at 4.
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this specific issue disagreed, ruling in Alter v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. 2 1 that GARA applies to civil actions regardless of
where the accident occurred. Other courts have implicitly ruled
that GARA applies to extraterritorial accidents, addressing the
application of GARA to claims arising out of such accidents without discussing the issue. 28 2 In Alter, survivor-plaintiffs filed two
separate wrongful death products liability actions in Texas state
court arising out of a helicopter crash in Israel. The plaintiffs
argued that GARA was inapplicable because legislation of Congress is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States, unless a contrary intent appears in the statute.
The plaintiffs relied on a United States Supreme Court case,
Smith v. United States, 28 3 which held that the Federal Tort Claims
Act does not waive the United States' sovereign immunity for
tort claims arising in Antarctica. The Alter court distinguished
Smith, noting that it involved a statute that created a cause of action. 214 In contrast, the court said, GARA eliminates certain
claims against aircraft and component manufacturers.2 8 5 The
court explained that: "Plaintiffs interpretation of GARA would
have the anomalous effect of preventing litigants from bringing
an action in the United States while allowing litigants to bring
the same action in the United States if the accident occurred
286
abroad.
IX.

GARA IS CLEARLY CONSTITUTIONAL

GARA's constitutionality as well as its application has been
challenged.287 Constitutional challenges may fall into two broad
Alter v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 531 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
See, e.g., Flores, Case No, 96-1507-C1V (considering whether GARA's rolling
statute of repose bars plaintiffs' claims arising out of airplane crash in Bolivia);
Glover v. American Resource Corp., No. 160673 (Cal. Super. Ct. Marin Cty., Sept.
13, 1996) (discussing application of GARA to claims arising out of airplane crash
in Argentina); Campbell, 82 Cal. Rtpr. 2d at 202 (applying GARA to claims arising
out of airplane crash in Australia).
283 Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993).
284 Alter, 944 F. Supp. at 541.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 See Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens, Leavy Mathews III, Federalism and
Federal Liability Reform: The United States Constitution Supports Reform, 36 HARXv. J.
LEclS. 269 (1999); (discussing constitutional bases for federal civil justice reform
legislation); Anton, supra note 11, at 800-803; Perry H. Apelbaum & Samara T.
Ryder, The Third Wave of Federal Tort Reform: Protecting the Public or Pushing the ConstitutionalEnvelope, 8 CORNELLJ. L. & PUB. POL'y 591, 635-37 (1999) [hereinafter
"Apelbaum & Ryder"] (discussing constitutional bass for federal civil justice re281

282
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categories: first, whether GARA is a legitimate exercise of Congressional authority, and, second, whether GARA is constitutional with regard to accidents that occurred before its
enactment, both in suits filed before and in suits filed after its
enactment date.
Interestingly, the first issue, that of the constitutionality of
Congress's enactment of GARA, has been rarely litigated and
few opinions discuss the issue. The second issue - that of
GARA's retroactivity - has been more thoroughly litigated.
Given that seven years have passed since the statute was enacted
and the applicable statutes of limitations on pre-GARA accidents
most likely have run, case law on the issue is important only with
respect to federal liability reform.
A.

GARA

WAS ENACTED UNDER CONGRESS'
ARTICLE I AUTHORITY

It is clear that GARA is a legitimate exercise of Congressional
power. Congress enacted GARA under its Commerce Clause authority, based on its concerns about the potential effects of
products liability suits on interstate economic activity. The
Supremacy Clause requires state courts to apply it. One commentator, apparently conceding these points, has suggested that
GARA interferes with individual constitutional rights and may
be subject to challenge under due process and equal protection
provisions.2"' Still, this commentator conceded that under the
"rational relation" test, GARA is probably constitutionally
sound. 28 9 Future efforts to challenge GARA's constitutionality
should prove unsuccessful. We will show why.
1.

Commerce Clause

The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution establishes the power of Congress "To regulate Commerce . ..
among the several States ....
-290 Under this Clause, Congress is
empowered to regulate three broad categories of activity: (1)
the use of the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in inform legislation); see also Boswell & Coats, supranote 18, at 556 ("Plaintiffs can be
expected to challenge the constitutionality of the statute of repose, as they have
challenged other examples of tort reform.").
288 See Anton, supra note 11, at 801-803.
289
290

Anton, supra note 11, at 803.
U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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terstate commerce, even if the threat to be addressed arises
from intrastate commerce, and (3) intrastate economic activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce.29 ' Congress must
have a rational basis to find that the regulated activity affects
interstate commerce, and select a means of regulation that is
reasonable and appropriate to achieve that end. 29 2
The Supreme Court has ruled that while local activity may not
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce when considered in isolation, it may have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce when considered in the aggregate. In Wickard v. Filburn, 29 3 the Court upheld Congress's regulation of the consumption of homegrown wheat because of its aggregate economic
effect on the interstate wheat market. The Court explained
that, "even if [the] activity [is] local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still... be reached by Congress if

it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. ' '294 The Court also concluded that Congress may regu-

late activity "irrespective of whether [the] effect is what might at
some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.' "295
Excessive litigation affects interstate commerce through high
damages awards, lack of uniformity and unpredictability under
state law, which add to the price of products, discourage innovation, and hamper the competitiveness of American businesses. 29 Indeed, the Brookings Institution found that of all the
segments of the U.S. economy adversely affected by the tort litigation explosion in the 1980s, the general aviation segment was
297
hit the hardest.
291 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
292 See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452
U.S. 264, 276 (1981); Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964).
293 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
294 Id. at 125.
295 Id.; see also Hodel, 452 U.S. at 277 ("Even activity that is purely intrastate in
character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like
conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States.").
296 See S. REP. No. 105-32, at 2-12 (1997) (accompanying Product Liability Reform Act of 1997). The Association of Trial Lawyers of America has dubbed
these "dubious contentions." SeeJeffery White, Does ProductsBill Collide With Tenth
Amendment, TRIAL, Nov. 1997, at 32 (using GARA as example of questionable federal imposition of federal rules on state courts to be used in determining civil
disputes).
297 See Martin, supra note 8, at 478-99. For examples of excessive and often
frivolous litigation, see Boswell & Coats, supra note 18, at 542-47.
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Congress made clear that GARA was enacted to address the
foundering general aviation industry. Congress found that an
"important factor in the decline of general aviation manufacturing has been the industry's product liability costs, which [had]
increased from $24 million in 1978 to more than $200 million a
year in recent years. "298 Significantly, Congress found that this
increase in liability costs had not occurred because aircraft had
become less safe; on the contrary, aviation accident rates had
been going down while liability costs were skyrocketing. 299
Congress found that because "[n]early all defects are discovered during the early years of an aircraft's life," "[i] t is extremely
unlikely that there will be a valid basis for a suit against the manufacturer of an aircraft that is more than 18 years old."3 ""' This is
particularly true in view of the fact that "[a] ircraft design and
manufacture are regulated by [the] FAA, which has the responsibility for ordering corrective action if a defect is revealed after
an aircraft design is approved. '' 3 1

Nonetheless, many suits

against the manufacturers of older aircraft had been brought in
the expectation that "the manufacturers will settle to avoid the
expense of litigation. 30 2 Congress explained that
"[m]anufacturers incur substantial expense from these cases.
Beech Aircraft testified that the average cost of litigation was
$500,000 per case, even though Beech was generally successful
in defending the case. '"" Further support for GARA came from
the Presidential Commission on the aircraft industry which recommended a federal statute of repose as a shot in the arm for
the general aviation industry."" 4
Congress clearly had a rational basis for enacting GARA. Evidence showed that overwhelming tort liability was decimating
the industry, with both interstate and international ramifications.'1 5 The enactment of the statute of repose was a legitimate
2)8 H.R. RUP. No. 103-525, pt. 1, at 3.
299 Congress reported that in 1978, there were 12 general aviation accidents
per 100,000 hours, with 1,276 fatalities. In 1993, the rates had declined to 6.8
accidents per 100,000, with 715 fatalities. Id. at 3. In fact, the drafter of the
report wrote, "NTSB data shows that only 1% of general aviation accidents are
caused by design or manufacturing defects." Id. at 4.
300Id.
31)1 Id.
302 1i.
303 Id.

304See President's Signing Statement, supra note 3, at 1678. See also discussion
at supra note 61.
3)5 H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 1, at 3-7; S. REP. No. 103-202 at 2-4 (1993).
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exercise of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause to
regulate activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce.306
Supremacy Clause

2.

With Congressional authority to enact GARA clearly established under the Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause applies to bar challenges against GARA based on a conflict with a
state law that would allow a lawsuit to be filed more than 18
years after delivery of the aircraft. (As discussed, GARA explicitly provides for the application of state statutes of repose that
are shorter than the upper time limit established by GARA.)
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution establishes that laws made by Congress in the exercise of its authority
are the "supreme Law of the Land."'" 7 If Congress decides that
an issue is important enough to the well-being of Americans to
deserve nationwide legislation and acts within its authority to develop such legislation, "the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.3118 To the extent the various
states have substantive liability laws addressing the same field as
laws enacted by Congress, the state laws are preempted and state
courts must enforce the federal laws."'

306 See, e.g.,
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61; cf. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (it was reasonable under Due Process Clause to
enact liability limitation for purpose of revitalizing an industry).
307 U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
308

Id.

309 See,

e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). The United States Supreme
Court has regularly upheld substantive federal legislation that preempts state tort
liability laws. See, e.g., Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 86 (upholding as constitutional
Price-Anderson Act limiting liability for nuclear incidents, as it bears rational relationship to Congress's desire to stimulate private sector investment in nuclear
power); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 as
amended by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, which establishes federal compensation scheme for coal miners alleging black lung disease); Mondou v. New
York, N.H. & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 51 (1912) (upholding constitutionality of Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908, which establishes federal workers'
compensation statute for railroad employees).
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B.

1.

CHALLENGES TO

GARA's

CONSTITUTIONALITY

Tenth Amendment Challenge

GARA has been subject to a states' rights challenge under the
Tenth Amendment to the United States - a "mirror image" of
the Supremacy Clause question. " " The Tenth Amendment provides that: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 311
States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people.
Historically, the Supreme Court has recognized Congress's
"extraordinary power" to enact legislation and has been reluctant to invoke the Tenth Amendment to limit that authority.
The Court has explained that "[a] s long as it is acting within the
powers granted it under the Constitution, Congress may impose
its will on the States. Congress may legislate in areas traditionally regulated by the States."3' 1 2 For example, the fact that Congress has traditionally deferred in large measure to state
regulation of the insurance industry, for example, does not
mean that Congress must continue to do so; Congress does not
invade areas reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment
"simply because it exercises its authority ... in a manner that
displaces the States' exercise of their police powers."3 3
The only significant federalism restraints on exercise of the
commerce power are that state regulatory processes may not be
"commandeered" for federal purposes, thereby insulating Congress from political accountability, and that state executive officials cannot be required to administer or enforce federal
regulatory programs. In New York v. United States,' 1 4 the Supreme Court of the United States struck down a provision of
federal legislation which directed the states to regulate the disposition of nuclear waste produced by the states. The Court
ruled that Congress may directly require or prohibit certain acts,
but that it lacked "the power directly to compel the States to
3'0 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) (inquiries into application of Congress' Article I powers and Tenth Amendment are "mirror
images" of each other).

311 U.S. CONST., amend. X.

See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (discussing how the
Supremacy Clause is the textual authority granting the federal government power
over the states in the U.S. system of federalism); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 5-20 (2d ed. 1988).
313 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 291 (upholding federal regulations of surface mining despite traditional state role in regulating land use).
-14 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 166.
312
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require or prohibit those acts." The Court noted that the Commerce Clause "authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state
governments' regulation of interstate commerce."'
The Court
drew a sharp distinction between permissible federal legislation
that directs state courts to enforce federal laws and unconstitutional legislation, such as the Waste Policy Act, that directs state
officials to create and enforce a congressionally mandated regulatory scheme. 1 6 The Court further stated:
Federal statutes enforceable in state courts do, in a sense, direct state
judges to enforce them, but this sort offederal "direction" of statejudges is
mandated by the text of the Supremacy Clause. No comparable constitutional provision authorizes Congress to command state legislatures to legislate.3 1 v
The Tenth Amendment also prevents Congress from requiring state executives to administer or enforce federal regulatory
programs. In Printz v. United States,'18 the Court invalidated a
portion of the 1993 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act
amendments to the Gun Control Act of 1968 ("Brady Act")."'
The Brady Act required the Attorney General to establish a national system for instant background checks on prospective
handgun purchasers and commanded the "chief law enforcement officer" of each local jurisdiction to conduct the background checks and perform related tasks until the national
system became operative. The Court said that while federal statutes imposing obligations on state courts were legitimate, their
legitimacy did not imply that Congress could impose obligations
on state executives. 2 " The Court wrote:
315 Id. The Court discussed two methods Congress could use to urge State
adoption of a legislative program consistent with federal interests:
First, under Congress' spending power, Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds ....
Second, where Congress
has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce
Clause, we have recognized Congress' power to offer States the
choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or
having state law pre-empted by federal regulation.
Id. at 167. If states decline to participate in a federal scheme, Congress may not
force them to do so. Instead, to have its way, Congress must preempt state law
and regulate directly. Id. at 176.
316 Id. at 178-79.
317

Id. (emphasis added).

318 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
319 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-925A (1994).
320

See Printz, 521 U.S. at 907-08.
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We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to
enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold
that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State's officers directly. The Federal Government
may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of
their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal
regulatory program. It matters not whether policy-making is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is
necessary; such commands are fundamentally3 2incompatible with
our constitutional system of dual sovereignty. '
These cases do not support the contention that GARA is unconstitutional. The decisions make it clear that Congress cannot compel state legislatures or executives to participate in a
federal regulatory or administrative scheme, but they suggest no
constitutional prohibition against legislation that asks state
courts to enforce a federal liability law. To the contrary, they
expressly distinguish state court enforcement of federal laws
from federal laws commanding state legislatures to legislate or
requiring state executive officials to administer a federal regulatory scheme. State courts have always been and continue to be
obligated to honor such legislation.
In contrast to the provisions examined by the Supreme Court
in Printz and New York, the GARA statute of repose is self-executing by its express terms. Nothing in GARA requires a state legislature to enact any law or a state administrative official to
implement federal law. Thus, GARA does not compel the states
or state officers to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
scheme. Rather, GARA is a matter of substantive federal law addressing the scope of recovery of plaintiffs in certain actions. As
such, state courts are bound to apply this law.
A Michigan court recognized these legal principles in Hinkle
v. Riley Aviation. 23 In this case, the plaintiff challenged GARA
on a number of constitutional grounds, focusing primarily on
an alleged Tenth Amendment violation. She argued that Congress "commandeered" the legislative processes of the states and
321

Id. at 935.

See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Pinciple? 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2185-86 (1998) (indicating that the Printz and
New York decisions set forth a "clear-cut rule against federal 'commandeering' of
state legislative or executive officials," but do not alter the responsibility of state
courts to enforce federal laws).
323 Hinkle v. Riley Aviation, No. 96-03161 NP (Mich. Cir. Ct., Branch Cty. Sept.
30, 1999).
22
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offended principles of dual sovereignty by compelling state officials to implement or enforce GARA.32 4 Interestingly, she only
indirectly suggested that Congress lacked authority to enact
GARA on the basis that no interstate commerce is involved. 5
With no discussion, the court denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment rejecting plaintiffs Tenth Amendment
challenge.3 2 6
Fifth Amendment Challenges

2.

Given that GARA was enacted under Congress's Commerce
Clause power, plaintiffs may seek to attempt to establish an
abridgment of their individual rights under the Due Process or
Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment.3 2v Such attempts should be unsuccessful.
Due Process Clause Challenge

a.

The Fifth Amendment provides that "No person shall be ...
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law. . . ." GARA does not violate due process guarantees, because plaintiffs do not have a property interest in a common law
cause of action against manufacturers of general aviation aircraft and their parts. The United States Supreme Court has
stated that "[o]ur cases have clearly established that a person
has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of common
law.""" Thus, the "Constitution does not forbid the creation of
new rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized by the comBrief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Disposition at 8v. Riley Aviation (Mich. Cir. Ct., Branch Cty. October 16, 1998) (No.
Hinkle
21,
96-03161 NP) [hereinafter "Hinkle Plaintiff's Brief'].
325 See id. at 10 n.13 (arguing GARA is guised "as an economic revitalization of
a failing market"); see also id. (GARA "appeared to invoke Congress' power to
regulate interstate commerce as the basis therefor").
326 Order re: Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Disposition Re: the Constitutionality of the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 at 1, Hinkle v. Riley
Aviation, No. 96-03161 NP (Mich. Cir. Ct. Branch Cty., Mar. 21, 1999).
3'27 Anton, supra note 11, at 801-803. In Schneider, the court, with little discussion, rejected the plaintiffs argument that application of GARA to her claims
violated her due process rights. Schneider, No. 542343, at 3.
328 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted); Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 88
n.32. If a plaintiff has an identified property right in statutorily created rights,
procedural limits cannot be placed on them without appropriate procedures befitting the nature of that right. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,
428-33 (1982). That is not the case here.
324
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mon law, to attain a permissible legislative object" 129 "despite the
fact that 'otherwise settled expectations' may be upset
thereby."33 The Supreme Court has noted that "statutes limiting liability are relatively commonplace and have consistently
been enforced by the courts. "331 Moreover, state statutes of repose have consistently been upheld under the Federal Constitution.332 Indeed, in Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A.,333 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected a plaintiff's
claim that her substantive due process rights were violated by
depriving her of her cause of action. The court explained that
"[w]e have squarely held that although a cause of action is a
Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 88 n.32 (quoting Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122
(1929)).
330/d. (quoting Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 16).
331Id. (citing Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (automobile guest statute); Providence &
New York S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578 (1883) (limitation of vessel
owner's liability); Thomason v. Sanchez, 539 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1976) (Federal
Drivers' Act); Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. An. v. Pan Am. Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338
(S.D.N.Y. 1944) (Warsaw Convention limitation on recovery for injuries suffered
during international air travel).
332 See Koch v. Shell Oil Co., 52 F.3d 878 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding Kansas
statute of repose on product liability actions against, inter alia, federal and state
due process and equal protection challenges); Eaton v. Jarvis Prods. Corp., 965
F.2d 922 (10th Cir. 1992) (upholding Colorado repose statute concerning prodtict liability actions on state and federal due process and equal protection
grounds); Harris v. Black Clawson Co., 961 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding
Louisiana repose statute concerning defective design or construction actions on
unspecified constitutional grounds); Alexander, 952 F.2d at 1215 (upholding Indiana repose statute concerning product liability actions on state and federal due
process and equal protection grounds); Lourdes High School, Inc. v. Sheffield
Brick & Tile Co., 870 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1989) (upholding Minnesota repose
statute barring actions for real property damage from challenge on federal due
process grounds); Oliveras-Salas v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 884 F.2d 1532 (1st
Cir. 1989) (upholding Puerto Rico repose statute concerning defective design or
construction actions on unspecified constitutional grounds); Eddings v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 835 F.2d 1369 (11 th Cir. 1988) (upholding Florida repose statute
concerning product liability actions on federal due process and equal protection
grounds); Ciccarelli v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 757 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1985)
(upholding Pennsylvania repose statute barring wrongful death actions against
federal due process and equal protection challenge); Wayne v. TVA, 730 F.2d 392
(5th Cir. 1984) (upholding Tennessee repose statute concerning product liability
actions on federal due process and equal protection grounds); Mathis v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 719 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1983) (upholding Tennessee products liability
statute of repose against claim it violated due process; "An injury in the nature of
a tort which occurs after a specified limitation period ... does not give rise to due
process protection.");Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1982) (upholding Minnesota repose statute concerning malpractice actions on federal due
process and equal protection grounds).
333Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A., 252 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2001).
29
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'species of property, a party's property right in any cause of action does not vest until a final unreviewable judgment is
obtained.' "
Even assuming that plaintiffs have a property interest in a
cause of action, the legislative balancing of interests reached by
Congress in GARA must be accorded the traditional presumption of constitutionality that is generally given to economic regulation. 3 5 Congress acted neither arbitrarily nor irrationally in
enacting GARA; therefore the federal statute of repose must be
upheld. -6 Under the Due Process Clause, economic regulations like GARA's statute of repose represent a "legislative effort
to structure and accommodate the 'burdens and benefits of economic life."' 337 Put another way, the test of due process is
whether Congress acted with a "legitimate legislative purpose
furthered by rational means, '" and "legislation is not unconstitutional because it upsets even settled expectations."3' 3 GARA's
statute of repose "emerges as a classic example of economic legislation" that must be upheld against a due process challenge
orbecause its purpose is to "remove economic impediments3 in
4
der to stimulate the private development" of an industry. 0
334 Id. at 1086 (quoting Grimesy v. Huff, 876 F.2d 738, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1989)).
335 "Assuming the courts continue to apply the lenient 'rational basis test,'

plaintiffs challenging federal tort reforms under the Fifth Amendment will be
placed in the difficult posture of overcoming the asserted legislative justifications.
This is a standard claimants have been unable to meet in Supreme Court cases
such as Usery and Duke Power." Apelbaum & Ryder, supra note 277, at 644.
'36 Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 83; Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 15.
337 Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 83 (quoting Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 15). It is well
established that such legislative acts "come to the Court with a presumption of
constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of a due process
violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational
way." (internal quotations omitted).
338 Romein, 503 U.S. at 191 (internal quotations omitted).
339 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 467 U.S. at 719-30 (and authorities cited
therein).
340 Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 83. Although as a formal matter in New York Central
and Duke Power the Supreme Court reserved the question of whether such a quid
pro quo is necessary for compliance with due process and equal protection, there
is a significant degree of dicta skeptical of such a requirement. See Apelbaum &
Ryder, supra note 277, at 647-48 (citing cases). Apelbaum & Ryder write that in
Duke Power, for example, before finding that the Price-Anderson Act provided an
adequate quid pro quo, the Court noted, "It is not at all clear that the Due Process Clause in fact requires that a legislatively enacted compensation scheme either duplicate the recovery at common law or provide a reasonablyjust substitute
for the common-law or state tort law remedies it replaces." Id. (quoting Duke
Power at 88). Even if such a quid pro quo were required, these authors argue, a
likely argument could be made that GARA provides necessary benefits to society
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Congress chose the 18-year time limitation to "strike a fair bal' by protecting manufacturers from
ance"341
the "long tail" of liability where their products have proved trustworthy in the long
term, while at the same time protecting injured parties' reasonable rights to recovery.3 4 2 Congress observed that liability costs
had increased despite improvements in the industry's safety record,343 and reported National Transportation Safety Board statistics indicating that only one percent of general aviation
accidents are caused by design or manufacturing defects.344
Congress concluded that this legislation "can make a major contribution to reversing the decline in general aviation aircraft
manufacturing. "Freed from excessive liability costs, manufacturers will be able to sell aircraft at lower prices. Relief from
most of the "tail" of liability for previously manufactured aircraft
will "enable the manufacturers to spend more on research and
development and enhance our manufacturers' ability to compete with foreign companies." '4 5 In view of Congress's considered analysis of the decline in the general aviation industry and
its cause, the statute of repose is a reasonable exercise of Congressional authority that is rationally related to its objective to
stimulate the general aviation industry.
b.

Equal Protection Challenge

GARA also survives scrutiny under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Economic legislation like
GARA does not employ suspect classifications or impinge on
fundamental rights; therefore it can withstand an equal protecgenerally, if not to the impaired claimants directly. Id. at 646. This contention
was accepted by the California Supreme Court in holding that state's medical
malpractice reforms against constitutional challenge. Fein v. Permanente Med.
Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985). The California court stated, "even if due process principles required some 'quid pro quo' to support the statute, it would be
difficult to say that the preservation of a viable medical malpractice insurance
industry in this state was not an adequate benefit for the detriment the legislation
imposes on malpractice plaintiffs." Id. at 681 n.18. Justice White dissented from
plaintiffs appeal of Fein, finding there was a clear split concerning the constitutionality of damage limitations in medical malpractice cases, noting, "[o]ne of
the reasons for the division among the state courts is [the quid pro quo] question
left unresolved by this Court in Duke Power....
See Fein, 474 U.S. at 894 (White
J., dissenting).
341 H.R. REP,. No. 103-525, pt. 1, at 3.
3,12 S. REP. No. 103-202, at 3; H.R. REP,. No. 103-525, pt. at 1, 3.
343 See id. at 2 (accidents per hours flown cut in half in fifteen-year period).
.144See id. at 3.
'145 Id. at 4.
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tion challenge "if there is any reasonably conceived state of facts
that could provide a rational basis for the classification. 3" 6 Eco34 7
nomic legislation comes with a presumption of rationality,
and under the rational basis test, "those attacking the rationality
of the legislative classification have the burden to negate every
conceivable basis which might support it."' 348 If the classification
created by economic legislation results in some inequality, it will
nevertheless be upheld if it has a reasonable basis. 49 State law
prostatutes of repose regularly have been upheld against equal
3 5 '
0
Constitution.
States
United
the
under
tection challenges
Congress had a rational basis to apply a statute of repose to
general aviation plaintiffs without similarly regulating commercial airline plaintiffs. Similarly, it had a rational basis to bar
claims against manufacturers of older general aviation aircraft
without barring claims against manufacturers of older commercial aviation aircraft or against maintenance operations.3 5 ' As
we have discussed, the record before Congress showed that general aviation manufacturing had suffered a profound decline in
part due to the filing of unjustified tort suits. There is no record
showing a comparable decline in commercial aviation manufacturing as a result of product liability litigation. The fact that
Congress chooses to regulate in one area, but not others, does

346 Fed. Communications Comm'n v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S.
307, 313 (1993) .
347 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 331 ("Social and economic legislation ... that does not
employ suspect classifications or impinge on fundamental rights must be upheld
against equal protection attack when the legislative means are rationally related
to a legitimate government purpose."). Rational basis analysis, an approach and
principle designed to provide substantial deference to the legislative body, provides a standard which generally yields a conclusion validating the legislation
under consideration. See Stephen J. Werber, A National Product Liability Statute of
Repose - Let's Not, 64 TENN. L. REV. 763, 768 (1997) [hereinafter "Werber"].
'48Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 314.
349 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
350 See, e.g., Schamel, 1 F.3d at 655; Eaton, 965 F.2d at 922; Harris, 961 F.2d at
547; Dinh v. Rust Int'l Corp., 974 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1992); Alexander, 952 F.2d at
1215; Cournoyer v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 744 F.2d 208 (1st Cir.
1984) (upholding Massachusetts repose statute concerning defective design or
construction actions against federal equal protection challenge); Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1984) (upholding North Carolina statute of
repose against equal protection challenge); Pitts v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d
276 (7th Cir. 1983).
351 See Werber, supra note 337, at 771 (making similar argument with regards
to national products liability repose statute).
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not render a statutory classification irrational. 5 2 Accordingly, it
was reasonable for Congress to limit GARA's application to that
portion of the aviation industry that had been stunted by product liability litigation.
In Lyon, the plaintiffs argued that their equal protection
rights were violated because Congress chose to exempt lawsuits
pending on the date of GARA's enactment from the statute of
repose, while applying GARA to claims that arose before its enactment, but had not yet been filed. 5 The court rejected this
argument, stating that: "In truth, what seems to gall the Survivors most is that other victims of the accident in question here
had already filed their actions." Relying on precedent, the
Ninth Circuit explained that Congress could legitimately limit
its concerns to people who "had legitimately and indisputably
relied on the state of the law prior" to the enactment of GARA.
The Court stated: "These individuals will suffer the most concrete injury because they have expended significant time and
effort to bring their action, not to mention substantial funds for
attorney's fees and court costs." '54
3.

Guarantee Clause Challenge

In Hinkle v. Riley Aviation, the plaintiff challenged GARA as
violative of the Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution. 55 The Guarantee Clause provides that "[t]he United
States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a Republican
Form of Government... ."... In most of the cases in which the

Supreme Court has been asked to apply the Clause, the Court
has found the claims presented to be nonjusticiable under the

"political question" doctrine.3 5 7 Based on the separation of pow35,2
See Dandridge,397 U.S. at 486-87 (stating that "the Equal Protection Clause
does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a
problem or not attacking the problem at all); Eaton, 965 F.2d at 930 (upholding
state statute of repose against equal protection challenge on Dandridge rationale).
'153Lyon, 252 F.3d at 1087.
'354Id. at 1087-88 (quoting Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 989 F.2d 1564, 157374 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding it is not unusual for Congress to draw distinctions
between claims that are already part of a commenced civil action and those which
are possible but have not yet been filed)).
355Hinkle Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 327, at 28-29.
356U.S. CONST., art. 1V, § 4.
157 See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 n.17 (1980) (challenge to the preclearance requirements of the Voting Rights Act); Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 218-229 (1962) (challenge to apportionment of state legislative districts); Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 140-51(1912) (chal-
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ers doctrine, the political question doctrine provides that courts
cannot consider controversies that revolve around policy
choices and value determinations that are constitutionally committed to the legislative or executive branch. 358 But even when
the Supreme Court recently "indulg[ed] the assumption that
the Guarantee Clause provides a basis upon which a State or its
subdivisions may sue to enjoin the enforcement of a federal statute," the Court concluded plaintiff had not made out a claim. 59
The Court noted that:
[T]he protection afforded states by the guarantee clause does
not prevent Congress from pre-empting areas of substantive state
law. The guarantee clause grants states a measure of autonomy
over their governmental processes; it does not promise them sovereignty over any aspect of private behavior. This ability of Congress to override state substantive authority through the
supremacy clause-while preserving the autonomy of state governmental processes under guarantee clause-assures a proper
balance between national power and state independence. 6 "
In Hinkle, the plaintiff argued that GARA "infringes upon
State sovereignty" because GARA "does not offer the state of
Michigan any choice." But that conclusion would apply to all
federal laws that preempt conflicting state laws, with equal force.
The preemption of state laws by validly enacted federal statutes,
of course, flows from the Supremacy Clause and in no way infringes upon the guarantee of republican government. In enacting GARA, Congress did not interfere with power properly
lenge to initiative and referendum provisions of state constitution); Luther v.
Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
358SeeJapan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221 (1986). Dismissal of claims for nonjusticiability under the political question doctrine is proper
only if there is 1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; 2) a lack of judicially discoverable
issue and manageable standards for resolving it; 3) the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; 4) the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; 5) an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or 6) the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores,
495 U.S. 385 (1990); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), Baker, 369 U.S. at 186.
If a case does not present any of these characteristics, which are essential to a
finding that the case raises a political question, the case is justiciable. MunozFlores, 495 U.S. at 385.
359 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 185-86 (emphasis added).
360 Id.
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exercised by the states, or with state legislative or administrative
machinery.
4.

"Open Courts" and First Amendment Challenges

Some have argued that GARA denies plaintiffs a "fundamental right" to free access to the courts, as it "locks the courtroom
doors" before a tort litigant may open them.3

61

To the extent

any such "free access to the courts" claim is based on state constitution "open courts" or "right to remedy" provisions,362
whatever these provisions may mean in state constitutions, they
cannot restrict the power of Congress;363 the United States Constitution lacks an "open court" or "right to remedy" clause and
these ambiguous "rights" will not be read into that document.
The First Amendment's petition clause has been found to
protect a citizen's right of access to governmental mechanisms
for the redress of grievances, including the right of access to the
courts for that purpose. 64 These cases establish that potential
plaintiffs must be able to realize whatever right of access to the
courts they may have, i.e., through claims having a basis in the
law, or a "legally protected injury," '6 5 and that government can36,Hinkle Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 327,at 24-25.
362 At least 39 states have some form of open courts provision. See Stephen J.
Werber, Let's Not, supra note 337, at 791 n.57 (citing David Schuman, The Right to
a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. Q. 1197, 1198 n.5, 1201-02 (1992)). Thirty-seven state constitutions contain provisions that provide that all courts shall be open and that
every person shall have a remedy by due process of law. See Anton, supra note 11,
at 801 (citing Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 999 (Ala.
1982) (collecting examples). Several state supreme courts have found their respective state statutes of repose unconstitutional under a rational relation test
because they violated the Constitution's open courts provisions or denied the
plaintiffs due process. See Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 639 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio 1994);
Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 861 P.2d 625 (Ariz. 1993); Berry v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985); Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co.,
471 A.2d 195, 200-01 (R.I. 1984); Daugaard v. Baltic Coop. Bldg. Supply Ass'n,
349 N.W.2d 419, 427 (S.D. 1984); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288
(N.H. 1983); Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 1004 (Ala.
1982).
363U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Nash, 389 U.S. at 239-40.
364 See, e.g.,
California Motor Trans. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508,
510 (1972) (anti-trust laws may not be used to prohibit filing of lawsuit regardless
of plaintiff's anti-competitive intent in doing so); Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc.
v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983) (filing and prosecution of suit may not be
enjoined as unfair labor practice); Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 439 n.18,
442-43 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 735 (1995).
5 Bill Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 743-44.
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not burden the exercise of those existing rights.366 Nothing in
these cases, however, requires the government to create a cause
of action or prevent Congress from eliminating a tort cause of
action. A plaintiff "cannot claim that [s] he has been denied access to court simply because the . . .legislature has restricted a

particular cause of action in a way that makes it unavailable to
[her]. Such an approach confuses 'access' with 'success,' and
[plaintiff] is not entitled to the latter."367
Complaints about GARA's statute of repose are not based on
a denial of any procedural right to go to court, they are based
on a substantive denial of a claim. That is not the denial of a
plaintiffs right to seek judicial relief. "The concept of constitutionally protected access to courts revolves around whether an
individual is able to make use of the court's processes to vindicate such rights as he may have, as opposed to the extent to
which rights actually are extended to protect or compensate
him.

368

GARA validly preempts state law and limits tort claims to
those that can be filed prior to the expiration of an 18-year period. Accordingly, plaintiffs have no legally cognizable interest
protected from encumbrance under the First Amendment.
C.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO

GARA's

APPLICATION TO

PRE-ENACTMENT ACCIDENTS

For a period after GARA was enacted some plaintiffs argued
that it was unconstitutional to apply GARA to accidents that occurred before it was enacted. Such challenges are fading, because, for the most part, limitations statutes have run on claims
arising prior to the Act's 1994 effective date. These cases have
relevance, however, to show that the courts have supported the
legislative purpose underlying GARA. The cases also have reles",6
See Sure-Tan. Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 897 (1984) (stating that Bill Johnson's was not applicable because the plaintiff had not suffered a "legally protected
injury" and the plaintiff had no 'Judicially cognizable interest" in procuring enforcement of immigration laws); Filippo, 30 F.3d at 442 (stating that the "petition
clause imposes on the United States an obligation to have at least some channel
open for those who seek redress for perceived grievances," but it is required to
recognize as a petition whatever communication is so characterized by protester);
Ciccarelli v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 757 F.2d 548, 554-555 (3d Cir. 1985)
(stasting that "there is no absolute unlimited constitutional right of access to
courts"; only reasonable right of access required).
367Bowman v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 832 F.2d 1052, 1054 (7th
Cir. 1987).
368

Id.
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vance as a guide to Congress if and when it enacts tort reform
legislation in the future.
In Rixon v. Smith,"' for example, the plaintiffs filed suit after
the effective date of GARA, based on an aircraft accident that
occurred prior to the Act's effective date. They challenged the
constitutionality of the application of GARA to pre-enactment
accidents on the ground that it violated their individual due process rights. 3

7

0

The federal court disagreed, upheld the Act as

constitutional, and granted the defense motion for summary
judgment. The district court adopted the opinion of the magistrate judge, which stated that statutes with retroactive impact are
constitutional if they meet the due process "rational basis" test:
'Judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within
the exclusive province of the legislative and executive branches."
The magistrate found that GARA's purpose was to "strike a fair
balance by providing some certainty to manufacturers ... while

[at the same time] preserving [a] victims' right to bring suit for
3 71

compensation...

As a direct effect of GARA, "manufacturers

are protected from defending ageless claims which are costly to
investigate and litigate and Plaintiffs, on the other hand, are extended a large window of time during which an injured party
can properly investigate and commence claims which appear to
be meritorious.

3

72

The court found that GARA's retroactive ap-

plication was based on rational reasoning and upheld the statute
as constitutional.373
Similarly, in Reynolds v. Textron, Inc., plaintiffs argued that
their due process rights would be violated by the application of
GARA to claims arising out of a crash that occurred three days
after GARA was enacted.17 ' The court found that GARA is a legislative act "adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic
life," and that therefore the statute would be presumed to be
constitutional unless Congress acted in an arbitrary and irra3"

Rixon v. Smith, No. 96-714 (W.D.Pa. Jan. 6, 1997).

370 See id.

See id. at 5 (citing H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 2, at 6).
Id. at 6.
.3 Id. The magistrate court further stated that the retroactive application of
GARA did not deprive plaintiffs of any property rights in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, since property rights in civil actions do not vest until judgment is
entered. Id.; see also Schneider, No. 542343, at 3 (granting the defense motion for
summary judgment and rejecting a challenge to the retroactive application of
GARA based on due process grounds with little discussion).
974 Reynolds, Findings of Fact, at 4-5.
'7'

372
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tional manner. 7 5 The court examined Congress's purpose in
enacting GARA, found that the statute was reasonably related to
a legitimate congressional purpose and met the rational basis
test for constitutionality.17 The court said GARA expressly applied to accidents occurring prior to its date of enactment:
"Congress drew a bright line between actions
filed on the date
3' 77
of enactment, and actions not so filed. 1
Conversely, In Handley v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., a California state
trial court refused to apply GARA retroactively. 7 GARA was enacted about seven weeks after the aircraft accident at issue. The
court acknowledged that "the Act makes clear that it is indeed
retroactive," but nevertheless ruled that GARA could not be constitutionally applied to the plaintiffs claim because to do so
would work a "manifest injustice."3 79 The Handley court relied
on a 38California
state appeals court case, Aronson v. Superior
Court, 0 to support its decision limiting the application of
GARA. The Aronson case dealt with a dispute involving a retrospective application of a shortened limitations period and stated
that a party nonetheless has a reasonable time to avail himself of
a remedy before the statute cuts off that right. "If the time left
to file suit is reasonable, no such constitutional violation occurs,
and the statute is applied as enacted, the Aronson court wrote, "If
no time is left, or only an unreasonably short time remains, then
the statute cannot be applied at all."38' 1 The Handley trial court
ruled that the seven-week period between the accident and the
enactment of GARA was "an unreasonably short time to be able
to analyze and thereafter perfect the remedy, all of which assumes that the plaintiff sought counsel within days after the acci375Id.
376 Id. at 5-7.
377 Id. at 7. See also Cartman, 1996 WL 316575 at *2 (stating that the amended

complaint against a manufacturer of defective component post does not "relate
back" Linder Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(c) so as to avoid GARA); Alter, 944 F. Supp. at
531; Altseimer, 919 F. Supp. at 340, 342-43 (stating that GARA bars claims that
arose before its enactment: "Although harsh, such a result is consistent with the
purpose of GARA to: 'establish a Federal statute of repose to protect general
aviation manufacturers from long-term liability in those instances where a particular aircraft has been in operation for a considerable number of years."'); Rickert
I, 923 F. Supp. at 1453.
378 Handley v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., No. 551197-7 (Cal. Super. Ct. Fresno Cty. June
10, 1996).
979Id. at 5.
380 Aronson v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. App. 3d 294, 297 (Cal. App. 1987).
383 Id. at 287, quoted in Handley, at 4-5.
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dent ... ". ,18 2 Assuming that Aronson was correctly decided, the
California trial court misapplied it: seven weeks is not an "unreasonably short time" to file a lawsuit.
The Handley trial court further erred by confusing the law governing limitations with that governing repose. As the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained in Lyon
when it rejected a similar procedural due process challenge to
using GARA to bar pre-enactment accidents:
The focus of a statute of repose is entirely different from the focus of a statute of limitations. The latter bars a plaintiff from
proceeding because he has slept on his rights, or otherwise been
inattentive. Therefore, it is manifestly unjust to tell somebody
that he has X years to file an action, and then shorten the time in
midstream. However, a statute of repose proceeds on the basis
that it is unfair to make somebody defend an action long after
something was done or some product was sold. It declares that
nobody should be liable at all after a certain amount of time has
passed, and that it is unjust to allow an action to proceed after
that ... While an injured party might feel aggrieved by the fact
that no action can be brought, repose is a choice that the legislature is free to make. 8 3
Like the Reynolds and Rixon courts, the Lyon court found
GARA to be constitutional when applied to pre-enactment accidents. In Lyon, the Ninth Circuit considered a substantive due
process challenge and an equal protection challenge to the retroactive application of GARA, as well as the procedural due process challenge. The court rejected the substantive due process
challenge on the ground that plaintiffs had no vested property
right in their cause of action." 4 The court also rejected the
equal protection argument, which was based on the fact that
other claimants who had filed suit based on the same accident
before GARA was enacted could proceed with their claims while
the Lyon plaintiffs could not. The Court ruled that it was "not
irrational" for Congress to exempt plaintiffs who already had
filed suit from the GARA repose period, since "[t] hese individuals will suffer the most concrete injury because they have expended significant time and effort to bring their action, not to
mention substantial funds for attorney's fees and court costs." ' 5
Handley, at 5.
Lyon, 252 F.3d at 1087.
3'84 Id. at 1086.
385 Id. at 1087-88 (citation omitted).
382
38
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X. CONCLUSION
GARA is now over seven years old. It has revived an industry,
general aviation, which was near extinction. It has produced
over 25,000 well-paying jobs. Of equal importance is the fact
that the planes manufactured since GARA are the safest in history. Manufacturers of safety equipment who had shied away
from allowing their use on planes because of the specter of unlimited liability now sell this equipment and improve it. Most
courts have respected the black letter and social policy that supports GARA. We put forth this article to help assure that they
will do so in the future.
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